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Abstract 
The goal of much of the research in disaster logistic models is to position facilities to 
meet a specific demand. These types of models locate distribution facilities based on relative 
weights of locations determined by demand. These types of models are similar in nature to 
classical location theory models such as p – median and or coverage type models. The ultimate 
goal of these types of models is to cover or service as much of the anticipated demand as 
possible. However, there is a growing consensus that the population or number of households 
within a specific geographical area is not necessarily the only weighting factor in determining 
need and/or demand for disaster relief. 
In an era after disaster events, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, there is an 
understanding that recovery efforts require large amounts of time and some populations, because 
of their vulnerabilities, may require more assistance than other populations. This requires that 
traditional disaster logistic models require additional weighting factors to help influence locating 
distribution facilities. This research proposes a simple multi-criteria approach that uses a 
geographical area’s relative measurement of social vulnerability to influence a model’s ability to 
locate distribution facilities. Using the research’s foundational model’s locations, as a basis, the 
solution network is transformed into a hub network 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
As the United States entered into the 21st century people became aware that a quicker 
response to a disaster would lead to a better  recovery for affected areas and  populations 
(“National Response Framework” 2008; “National Disaster Response Framework” 2011). Over 
the last decade, there has been an understanding that the United States is facing increasing 
numbers of devastating events to communities because of three broad factors. The first factor is 
that populations are moving towards areas of high risk. The second factor is a two-pronged 
problem – the belief that there is a greater occurrence of events and that those events are costing 
more. The third factor is an aging infrastructure. 
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The United States has become an increasingly coastal country. From 1960 to 2008 there 
has been an 85% increase in the population living in saltwater coastal counties (Wilson and 
Fischetti 2010). This trend is outlined in Figure 1.1.In addition to more people living along the 
coast, increasing numbers have moved into other potentially hazardous natural areas. These areas 
could be prone to events such as forest fire, river flooding, or an earthquake. Table 1.1 
summarizes some findings about wildland urban interface (WUI), which is associated with 
damage to homes because of a wild fire. More people moving into these areas have put these 
populations at greater risk and they are made more vulnerable (Stein et al. 2013; White 1945; 
Burton, Kates, and White 1993). Similar trends are seen as populations move closer to existing 
industrial areas or as those industrial areas expand out towards existing populated areas (Santos 
and Kraus 2013; “West Virginia Oil Train Derailment Threatens Water Supply” 2015; Zelinsky 
and Kosinski 1991).  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Coastal counties as defined by the US Census Bureau and population growth 
trends (Wilson and Fischetti 2010) 
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Table 1.1 WUI Quick Facts 
 Almost 1/3 of US homes (37 million) were located in the WUI in 2000 
 3.8 million homes in California are in WUI – the most of any state in the US 
 Over 2/3 of all the land in Connecticut is identified as WUI 
 More than 1 million homes were added to the WUI in CA, OR, and WA between 
1990 and 2000 
 The greater the natural amenities in an area the more prevalent the WUI – such as 
places like northern Great Lakes, Missouri Ozarks, and northern Georgia 
 Almost every urban area in the Rocky Mountains or Southwest has a large ring of 
WUI because of population growth and the buildup of medium and low—density 
housing in low-elevation forested areas. 
                                                                                                                              (Stein et al. 2013) 
Within the discussion of climate change, there is an ongoing debate as to whether or not 
such changes are creating more events. In this debate, there is an acknowledgment that one of the 
impacts of climate change will be changes in climate variability and weather extremes. In the 21st 
century, projections are that the number of hot and very hot days will increase and the opposite 
will occur for cold and very cold days. There will be more intense precipitation events and 
increased summer drying over mid-latitude areas, which could lead to more drought periods. 
Tropical cyclone and Asian summer monsoons precipitation is predicted to increase in intensity, 
frequency, and unpredictability (van Aalst 2006).  
The worldwide views is that disasters triggered by natural hazards are harming more 
people and costing more to recover (O’Brien et al. 2006). There is economic evidence and 
analysis that disasters will cost more in the future. For the City of New York, Swiss Re estimates 
that the annual losses due to weather will increase by over 250% from 1.7 billion dollars to 4.4 
billion by 2055. Figure 1.2 shows the results of Swiss RE’s loss models for the City of New 
York through the mid—21st century (“Swiss Re Provides Expert Input for New York City Study” 
2013). The United States’ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) reported 
that from 1980 through 2013 there were nearly 200 one billion dollar weather related disasters in 
the United States, and that those events are increasing at a rate close to 5% per year. The billion 
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Figure 1.3 Weather and climate billion dollar disasters for year 2014(“Billion Dollar 
Natural Disasters 2014” 2015) 
 
dollar events are summarized in Figure 1.3. (“NOAA: Billion-Dollar Weather/Climate Disasters” 
2013; A. B. Smith and Katz 2013). In addition to the increase in events, there is an ever-
increasing reliance on higher levels of governments to help local governments finance the 
recovery from such disasters. This trend can be seen in the increase of United States federal 
government disaster declarations over the last several decades (“Disaster Declarations by Year” 
2013). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Loss Frequency curve and growth in losses from storm surge created by Swiss 
RE model for New York City (“A Stronger, More Resilient New York” 2013) 
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The third critical factor, within the United States, is an aging infrastructure. The problems 
with United States’ infrastructure can be seen as twofold. The first problem is that the lack of 
resiliency within these systems can magnify the consequences of harmful events. Research on 
the causes and magnitude of Hurricane Katrina focused on how the weakened and aged flood 
control systems contributed to the severity of the event. Mileti views a city as a complex system 
which is continuously exposed to risks and threats from physical, engineered and socioeconomic 
subsystems (Mileti 1999). The systems that were in place did not perform as they were expected 
to or outright failed, and those failures led to greater damage to the City of New Orleans as a 
result of Hurricane Katrina (Comfort 2006). Interconnections between different infrastructure 
systems and how those systems co-exist, in the same space, are critical to managing a harmful 
event (O’Rourke 2007). Infrastructure can suffer greater damage if aged or if it has not been 
made resilient as required (Lieberman 2014). The aging infrastructure can be the cause of the 
disaster. Over the last decade, several major interstate highway bridges have collapsed. This has 
led to economic hardships and stresses on the affected communities (ASCE 2015). Table 1.2 
outlines the “report card” for United States infrastructure as compiled by the American Society 
of Civil Engineers for 2013. Further increased use of aging infrastructure, such as the increases 
in oil railcar traffic, can lead to hazardous conditions or disasters (“West Virginia Oil Train 
Derailment Threatens Water Supply” 2015). 
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Table 1.2 2013 Infrastructure Report Card for the U.S. 
System  Grade 
Dams D 
Drinking Water D 
Hazardous Waste D 
Levees D- 
Solid Waste B- 
Waste Water D 
Aviation  D 
Bridges C+ 
Inland Waterways D- 
Ports C 
Rail C+ 
Roads D 
Transit D 
Energy D+ 
                                                                                                                                     (ASCE 2015) 
 
1.2 Research Statement 
This research will address the issue of being able to account for a location’s vulnerability 
into a model to develop a disaster relief supply chain. The research will attempt to incorporate a 
location’s vulnerability information into location-allocation model to establish a disaster relief 
supply chain. A multiobjective approach is used to integrate information about risks and 
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population vulnerabilities of a place to make the required location-allocation models more 
accurate.  
The research will have two overreaching questions: 
 
1. How can information gathered from existing techniques, to measure social 
vulnerability and risks of a place, be integrated into location-allocation models to 
better optimize a disaster relief supply chain? 
 
2. In examining the current conditions of the state of Connecticut can the developed 
or proposed model be used with actual available data for the state, and can that 
model and data be used within the simulation of disaster event? 
 
1.3 Summary and Dissertation Outline 
The literature offers a robust examination and debate as to what is a disaster. There has 
been considerable research on the optimization of disaster relief supply chains. Furthermore, 
there have been discussions on how to measure risk and vulnerability to hazards. However, there 
has been little research on how to integrate information about population risks and vulnerabilities 
into developing disaster relief supply chains. This research will attempt to present a 
straightforward method to integrate such information into the decision making process. 
Additionally, this research will offer insights of how the model would respond to an actual 
disaster event. 
This project will use a combination of census data, locational data, statistical analysis and 
geospatial analysis to help identify vulnerable populations in order to create input values for 
 
 
8 
 
location-allocation modeling techniques that will be used to develop disaster relief supply chains. 
A disaster relief supply chain is similar to a conventional supply chain. It is a network or system 
of facilities and distribution options for a bundle of goods or services. The supply chain can 
consist of all the stages required to fulfill a consumer’s request. For the case of a disaster relief 
supply chain, the consumers can be considered those populations affected by the event. The 
network contains the transporters, warehouses, facilities, suppliers and consumers of the required 
goods. This research will emphasize the development of the foundational supply network 
without regard to specific goods or services required by people affected by a disaster. The 
research will develop a stepwise analysis of the development of a multiobjective approach to 
developing a disaster relief supply chain. A foundational model will be developed in which 
information about a geographical area’s vulnerability could be utilized to influence the 
performance or options proposed by the model. The research proposed will add to the broader 
understanding of disaster relief location-allocation models by developing techniques to better 
pinpoint and prioritize potentially affected populations.  
Chapter Two will review the current body of literature to define the idea of disaster for 
this research. The chapter will present and develop the concept of a disaster event from a 
geographic perspective. Examined within the chapter will be the relationships among disaster, 
risk, hazards and vulnerability. A discussion of techniques to measure risk and vulnerability will 
be presented. Further, examined will the development and use of location-allocation models to 
locate public facilities.  
In Chapter Three, a model will be developed and tested within a randomly generated 
universe for the distribution of disaster relief supplies. The model will incorporate measures of 
social vulnerability to better pinpoint neighborhoods that may require more aid. This will differ 
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from other research in which population or household values were used as the only measure of 
demand. A stepwise approach will be presented to develop a multiobjective location allocation 
model. 
The study area will be examined in Chapter Four. The chapter will discuss the 
development and collection of information for the State of Connecticut. Since the State of 
Connecticut does not have an intermediate governmental organization, i.e. county government, 
an argument for a regional cooperative area is presented, and the regional cooperative area is 
defined. The chapter will put forth the required information and data required by the model, 
developed in Chapter Three, to build disaster relief supply chain. 
Chapter 5 will build on the region of study developed in Chapter 4. In the chapter, the 
proposed model will be tested for a developed region in the State of Connecticut. The 
performance of the model will be examined. The model will then be tested for a simulated event. 
To conclude, a summary and ideas for future research will be presented in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Over the last sixty years, there has been a large body of literature where geographers have 
studied disasters. Geographers have primarily focused on a single aspect of what defines a 
disaster. They tended to examine disasters from the perspective of the natural hazards associated 
with such events. The concept of a disaster is much more complex than a single factor. Other 
social scientists have examined disasters in terms of the social and psychological effects on a 
group or community.  Coupling those concepts and understandings with those of geography’s 
understanding of the interactions between people and place allows for a more comprehensive 
definition of a disaster. 
As disasters become more complex and grow in scale there is a need for longer recovery 
times. Longer recovery times may require establishing recovery systems for extended periods, 
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and those systems are required to be more stable over longer timeframes. Location-allocation 
models allow planners to simultaneously locate facilities and allocate the associated demand for 
those facilities. These models allow planners to place public facilities in locations to achieve the 
greatest social utility. The models also allow planners to account for the size and makeup of the 
required demand. These characteristics make the models extremely useful in planning for 
disaster recovery supply chains. 
 
2.2 Defining the Concept of a Disaster 
 
The sociologist Carr is considered the first to study and develop an understanding of what 
a disaster is and how such an event progresses. Carr discussed the scope, character and phases of 
a disaster. At a foundational level, he classified disasters based on their consequences. He built 
upon the foundation to clarify that disasters differ in complexity. A single disaster can have 
many different physical forces operating at any time during the event. These differing forces 
could result in differing “violence” or degrees of cultural destruction. Carr believed that different 
disasters could be distinguished in two ways: (1) the character or type of event and (2) the scope 
or extent of “cultural collapse.” Carr defined four types of disasters. The first type was an 
instantaneous-diffused type. This type of event occurs rapidly, and is short lived. The impact or 
extent is seen throughout an entire community. The opposite of that type is an instantaneous-
focalized type. This event happens rapidly and is short lived, but the impact of the event is 
confined to a smaller area. The next two types are similar in extent, but occur over longer 
periods. A progressive-diffused event occurs over hours, days, or weeks and affects a large area, 
where a progressive-focalized event effects a smaller geographical area. (Carr 1932). 
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Carr discussed disasters in the context of social/cultural change. In such change, he 
believed that there were “sequence-patterns.” This “sequence-pattern” to change had three 
phases. The first phase was the preliminary or prodromal period. During this phase, the forces 
that are going to cause the change, damage or collapse are getting under way. The second phase 
is the actual onset of the catastrophic forces. This phase is highlighted by the collapse of 
“cultural protections,” and was called the dislocation or disorganization phase. The third phase 
was the readjustment and reorganization. Carr points out that the time from the catastrophe until 
the emergency plans begin to operate is the “confusion-delay.” The length of “confusion-delay” 
helps to distinguish between diffused (covering wider areas) and focalized (smaller area) 
disasters. At the time of his research, Carr points out that no communities had, in his time, any 
plan or pre-arranged organization to deal with the disorganization of community services caused 
by a disaster (Carr 1932). 
Almost ten years prior to Carr’s examination and defining of disasters the discipline of 
geography was at one of its historical crossroads. Harlan Barrows, in his speech to the 
Association of American Geographers in 1923, examined the crossroad facing geography and the 
paths that lie ahead. He developed his concept of geography as being the study of human 
ecology. He pointed out that many other sciences had begun to study many aspects of the earth’s 
environment in more detail than had been studied by geography. Barrows believed that 
geography’s strength would be in its ability, as a scientific discipline, to study human interaction 
within a particular “environmental complex,” and within this complex would be various 
elements such as landforms, vegetation, soils, climate, and animals. Geography’s job would not 
be to determine the origin or foundation of those elements, but to examine how humans react to 
the elements or how humans interact with those elements in the complex (Barrows 1923). A 
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simpler understanding of this concept is that geography’s strength was in studying, describing 
and understanding the interaction between people and place, and how the characteristics of place 
form those interactions. Barrows belief in the study of human – “environmental complex” 
interactions would be fundamental in the study of natural hazards. 
In 1942, Gilbert White wrote his seminal work regarding how people in the United States 
had dealt with and adjusted to the flood hazard. His study covered about 24 years of the early 
Twentieth century. White studied the problem of flooding at the national level, and presented a 
“geographical approach” to the nation’s flood problem. His “geographical approach” to the flood 
problem examined issues within the flood plains over a wide geographical area. He examined the 
issues and alternative solutions to flood abatement in terms of how they affected the United 
States not just the particular flood plain. He attempted to find solutions to flooding issues that 
would yield maximum returns for the United States with minimal costs to the country. He 
focused not only on the type of physical adjustments and adaptions taken on by people in 
response to flooding, but also the historical policy changes taken by the United States federal 
government. His research found a system of hodgepodge laws, policies and spending bills to help 
alleviate the suffering caused by flooding (White 1945). 
Two significant historical contexts help understand White’s work. The first being the date 
White wrote it – June 1942. In June of 1942, the United States was six to seven months into a 
worldwide war that would last for another three years. Within disaster research, events of World 
War II and the subsequent Cold War period, between the United States and the former Soviet 
Union, would add to the definition of disaster. The second is that during the Depression Era 
(1929-1940) the United States embarked on a campaign that attempted to tame the environment. 
The federal government through work projects and other programs would spend tens of millions 
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of dollars draining swamps, changing and controlling river courses, damming rivers for both 
flood control and electricity production, and developing techniques to keep winds from stripping 
vast areas of soil. The forces of nature had not tested many of those projects and ideas at the time 
of White’s study. White had the insight to examine both the physical adjustments people made to 
flooding and the policy adjustments taken by the US federal government (White 1945). His main 
conclusion about such policies was that some of those policies may have actually caused more 
harm than good (Hewitt 1997). White felt that many policies might have encouraged people to 
stay or rebuild in risky areas. 
White’s work was in step with Barrows human ecology model for geography. White 
examined the flooding problem in the United States from what he called a “geographic 
approach.” This approach examined the interaction between people and place, in addition to how 
these interactions contributed to, adjusted to or prevented the flooding of an area. The “Natural 
Hazard Paradigm” would emerge from White’s work 
The “Natural Hazard Paradigm” would be foundational to the growing body of 
disaster/hazards research in geography over the next several decades. Burton, Kates, and White 
make the observation and connection between the state of hazards research and Barrows’ human 
ecology concept (Burton, Kates, and White 1968). Additionally, they succinctly presented the 
Natural Hazard Paradigm in five points: 
1. Assess the size and extent of the population within the hazard zone. 
2. Identify the full range of possible adjustments the population has made because      
of the hazard. 
3. Observe or study how people perceive and estimate the occurrence of the hazard. 
5. Develop the optimal set of adjustments to the hazard and their social consequences 
(Burton, Kates, and White 1968) 
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The Natural Hazard Paradigm is still used as a practical basis in research today. Even though the 
paradigm is foundational to the study of disasters, the definition of disasters would develop into a 
more complex concept. 
 As the idea of what defines a disaster has been discussed and researched, there has been 
some criticism of the full acceptance of the natural hazard paradigm. The paradigm is not seen as 
the definitive description of a disaster. Hewitt believes that following the paradigm leads to 
thoughts or beliefs that communities are passive victims of natural and technological hazards. He 
believed in the need for a more comprehensive definition of what makes up a disaster, because 
such a definition makes it seem those communities need only technical knowledge and advice to 
control hazards. He concludes that a disaster is a much more complex thing that involves 
technical knowledge, uncertainty, and social and political vulnerabilities of a community (Hewitt 
1995). 
Erikson examined the complex nature of the relationship among people, place, and 
disaster in his analysis of the 1972 Buffalo Creek, West Virginia flood. In February 1972, over 
100 million gallons of water broke its way through an old earthen mining company dam. The 
water flowed through the narrow hollow of Buffalo Creek and it devastated the community. 
Erikson pointed out that though the people of Buffalo Creek were victims of the terrible flood 
they might not have been passive to the events. The community’s strong interaction with the 
place, through their employment by the mining-company and their strong engagement in the 
mining operations, would make them fully aware of the dangers. Erikson did point out the 
community was most likely powerless to prompt the mining company to better maintain the dam, 
but they were well aware of the risks in living in the area and other risks associated with the 
mining of coal (Erikson 1976). 
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As the United States exited World War II and entered the Cold War era, with the former 
Soviet Union, disaster research became a more formalized field of research in terms of studying 
the various components of a disaster. The concept of a disaster would also take on a more 
ominous tone and approach in study. The ideas of massive evacuations and panic would be 
studied (Bernert and Iklé 1952; E. Quarantelli 1954). Those types of studies got much of their 
data, insights and emphasis on situations from World War II Europe. Additionally massive aerial 
bombings were also studied (Hewitt 1983). Fritz would echo the tone of the era regarding 
disaster studies. Fritz believed there were two practical needs for such studies: 
“…first, to secure more adequate protection of the nation from destructive and 
disruptive consequences of potential atomic, biological, and chemical attack, and 
second to produce the maximal amount of disruption to the enemy in the event of 
war.” (Fritz 1961) 
 
Claude Gilbert would present that one of the three approaches to disaster research was “Patterns 
of War Approach.” He believed that the United States undertook disaster research to understand 
the reactions of populations during wartime circumstances. Natural hazards were used as 
wartime analogs, and the “market” directed the topics focused on by disaster research. The 
“market” was organizations, such as U.S. Dept. of Defense, involved in the planning for any 
potential war and the defense of the United States from an enemy (Gilbert 1995). 
Fritz believed that disasters could have varying degrees of scale. He said that disasters 
could occur to individuals, a family or small group, a community, a region, a nation, or the entire 
world. A disaster causes disruption of the social context or is a departure from what is normally 
expected. These events are concentrated in time and space. He does clarify that events that do not 
disturb the vital functions of a society are considered a crisis or an emergency, but not a disaster. 
According to Fritz, disasters differ in six main ways: 
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1. Degree of predictability, probability, and controllability. 
2. Nature of the damaging agent (i.e., flood, fire, explosion, or hurricane). 
3. The origin of the event (man-made or natural). 
4. Speed of onset (instantaneous or progressive). 
5. Scope or extent (focalized or diffused). 
6. Destructive effects of people and physical objects. 
                                                                                      (Fritz 1961) 
 
Zelinsky and Kosinski reached some of the same conclusions as Fritz’s definition. They 
described disasters as events that were concentrated within a defined space and time. The event 
caused damage to property or loss of life. A disaster disrupts all or some functions of routine life. 
They observed that a disaster that does not take place or is deferred long past the anticipated or 
expected date could still be considered a true disaster if such anticipation caused disruptions to 
the normal or expected routine of life. In other words the threat of a potential disaster could lead 
to disruptions that in themselves are a disaster (Zelinsky and Kosinski 1991). Kreps would 
further emphasize the time and space boundaries and impacts on social units within his definition 
of disaster (Kreps 1984). Hewitt examined techniques to determine the probability and 
predictability of natural events that may lead to disasters (Hewitt 1970). 
In the wake of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant accident (Dauphin County, 
PA), in 1979, Perrow examined the incident as a “normal” accident. He believed that “normal” 
accidents are products of their systems. He emphasized that a “normal” accident will occur at 
some facility, the particular event accident will probably occur again, and most likely even occur 
at the best of facilities. He saw a “normal” accident as a sequence of connected events that 
moved along because of the events relationship within the system. He outlined four 
characteristics of a “normal” accident: (1) the signs of the impending problem are only 
recognizable after the accident, (2) the accident encompasses multiple design and equipment 
failures, (3) operator error – which like the signs of the problem are not seen as errors until the 
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final analysis, and (4) the three other characteristics have a cascading effect that compounds or 
intensifies the problem much greater than the sum of each single design, equipment, or operator 
error (Perrow 1981). This type of analysis makes it clear how a natural event coupled with 
technological and socioeconomic subsystems of a place can lead to the amplification of the event 
into a disaster (Comfort 2006). 
In examining the “Natural Hazard Paradigm” and the debate of what are the components 
of a disaster allows a definition of a disaster to emerge. The event is confined within specified 
time and space boundaries. An outside agent causes the event, which may be man-made or 
natural. This outside agent causes damage to physical structures, injuries to people, and/or major 
disruption to the normal expected flow of everyday life or society. Disasters have a spatial 
organization. The extent of the damage caused by a disaster is the spatial definition. This damage 
could be in terms of physical infrastructure or location of human casualties. Wallace examined a 
tornado in Worcester, MA, and as part of his analysis, he produced a diagram to describe the 
spatial organization of disaster relief effort. This diagram is shown in Figure 2.1.  In his diagram, 
he represented the disaster area as a series of concentric circles. In the center, ring/circle is the 
“Total Impact” area. In this area, the most powerful of the outside forces are concentrated, and 
within this area, the most damage and injuries occur. The next ring is the “Fringe Impact” area. 
This ring includes less damage and casualties. The two rings Total and Fringe make up the 
“Impact Area.” The third ring is the “Filter Area.” This is the area where people are traveling 
through to move away from the “Impact Area” and responders are traveling through to enter the 
“Impact Area”. The next rings show how the aid to the “Impact Area” is spatially organized 
(Wallace 1956). Zelinsky and Kosinski presented a similar type of spatial organization. Their 
“doughnut “shaped model was used to describe the spatial organization of an evacuation 
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following a disaster. In their model, people avoided the “doughnut hole.” Their “doughnut” 
portion could be seen as Wallace’s “Filter Area” and their “doughnut hole” was the same as 
Wallace’s “Impact Area.” The “doughnut hole” was the area where the most damage had 
occurred. The greatest collection of people avoiding the event would be found outside of the 
“doughnut.” Zelinsky and Kosinski emphasized that people will flee away from danger. ((E. 
Quarantelli 1954; Zelinsky and Kosinski 1991). Cutter points out that the spatial boundaries or 
extent of a disaster sometimes cannot be determined until after the actual event occurs (Cutter 
2001). 
 
Figure 2.1 Wallace's description of the spatial organization of relief efforts for the 1953 tornado 
in Worcester, MA (Wallace 1956). 
Included in the definition of a disaster are the classifications of different disaster types. 
The specific agent or cause of damage or disruption is used to classify disasters. The broad 
categories of the causes of disasters are natural, technological, and social. Types of natural 
disasters include things like flood, hurricane, and earthquake. Technological disasters are things 
like accidental explosions, unintentional chemical releases, and transportation accidents. Social 
disasters are caused by human-to-human interactions. A disaster can be caused by a compound 
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hazard, which can be a combination of a natural and a technological hazard that combine to 
cause the disruption. Disasters can also be considered complex. This type of disaster is similar to 
a compound hazard – however, there is generally some aspect of a social hazard in combination 
with other factors. An example of a complex disaster is a widespread famine which is caused by 
natural hazard (flood or drought) and this condition is amplified by an oppressive government 
(Hewitt 1997). Figure 2.2 describes the types of disasters as outlined by Hewitt. 
 
Hazard Type Examples 
Natural 
Atmospheric 
Hydrological 
Geological 
Biological 
Hail, snow, tornados, hurricanes, blizzards 
 
Floods, drought, sea-ice, glacier advances 
 
 
Landslides, earthquakes, volcanic eruption 
 
Epidemic, blights, insect plagues 
Technological 
Hazardous Materials 
 
Destructive processes 
 
Devices or machines 
Installations 
 
Sector or organizations 
Physical (asbestos fibers), chemical, flammable, biotech 
Structural failure, explosion, fire, radiation 
 
Explosive, aircraft, oil tankers 
 
Power plants, dams, LNG terminals, pipelines 
 
 
Petrochemicals, airlines, road transportation, mining 
Social  
Weapons 
 
Release of dangerous 
natural forces 
 
Release of dangerous 
technological forces 
 
Armed forces and weapon 
systems 
 
Strategies and tactics 
Conventional (gun, bombs), unconventional (nuclear, 
chemical, biological) 
 
Arson, triggering landslide or flood, weather 
modification 
 
Terroristic acts against fuel storage, nuclear plants, 
chemical plants, and dams 
 
Massive air bombing, guerilla warfare 
 
 
Economic blockade, sieges, ethnic cleansing 
Figure 2.2 Disaster Classification (Hewitt 1997) 
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2.3 Hazard, Risks and Vulnerability 
As disaster research began to enter, the latter part of the Twentieth Century there was an 
understanding that populations were not simply at the whim of natural or man-made forces. 
From this understanding developed the idea that some elements of a disaster may be based on 
socially or politically constructed parts of a societal unit. These socially or politically constructed 
elements may work in concert with the outside agent to form a disaster. The term vulnerability 
began to appear within disaster research. When the term first appeared, the idea of vulnerability 
was vague and not clearly defined (Wisner 1993).  
Early research would link vulnerability with the income and poverty levels of differing 
segments of a population. Wisner argued for a larger pool of factors to be used to determine the 
vulnerability of a population to particular hazards. He believed that a community’s overall 
structure for the production of goods and housing was not a direct indication of the vulnerability 
for the basic community units (households, for example). He pointed the households, of a 
community, access to resources in the time of crisis as a more accurate indication of 
vulnerability. In his opinion, this measurement of vulnerability was much more complex than the 
simple formula of wealth or income of a region (Wisner 1993). 
Working along the path forged by White, geographers looked within the Natural Hazard 
Paradigm to establish vulnerabilities. As previously discussed, the paradigm examines how a 
population makes, chooses, and executes adjustments made because of the hazard. Population 
evacuation is an adjustment to a hazard. Baker studied who would leave and who would stay 
during an evacuation period prior to a hurricane. His work developed a description, for planners 
and emergency managers, of those who would be vulnerable (not leave) and those who would 
not be vulnerable (would evacuate) to a hurricane hazard. This analysis would form a crude 
 
 
22 
 
measure of vulnerability to the hurricane hazard. Additional factors beyond wealth and income 
of household began to emerge a factors relating to vulnerability. Baker examined things like age, 
mobility, transportation options, location of the household, and perception of warnings. His 
initial research looked at who evacuated and who did not, but later he would examine the 
“preparedness” of a household, offering an early predictor of the factors that may make a 
household vulnerable (Baker 1979; Baker 2011). Similar studies were done for technological 
hazards. The response of population during the Three Mile Island accident were studied (Zeigler, 
Brunn, and Johnson Jr 1981). Hypothetical scenarios were studied to develop an understanding 
as to who would and would not evacuate, when given instructions to do so, during a potential 
nuclear power plant accident (Zeigler and Johnson 1984; Mileti and Peek 2000). 
Disasters are the result of the relationship among hazards, risk, and vulnerability. A 
hazard is a potentially damaging event or phenomenon. Vulnerability is the susceptibility to 
harm from exposure to a hazard (Adger 2006). Vulnerability can take several forms and locus. 
The forms which vulnerability can take are among exposure to a hazard, structural weakness, 
lack of response capabilities, and powerlessness. The locus can be at any of the following levels: 
individual, domestic (or household), gender (or race), geographic space (Hewitt 1997). Of 
importance, to this research, will be vulnerability in the form of exposure to a hazard and with a 
locus of defined geographic space. Risk is the probability that a hazard will result in damage or 
disruption to a community. Risk can be measured in terms of the number of potential casualties 
or cost of economic loss or physical infrastructure damage. Quarantelli observed that there was 
complexity in the concepts and defining elements of a disaster, and he proposed that the research 
move towards a more holistic approach while moving away from the particular hazard case-
based approach (E. L. Quarantelli 1987). The “hazards paradigm” was not static, but dynamic. 
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The research had moved from the study of specific hazards towards concepts that encompassed 
both complexity of an event and social causation. The past research was further criticized for 
neglecting the social and economic constraints that could lead to limited choices of affected 
people and governments (Burton, Kates, and White 1993). 
Gilbert broadened the analysis of hazard, risk and vulnerability. Two of his three models 
of a disaster involved vulnerability and uncertainty. One model was an understanding that the 
social and economic makeup of a group or community may present vulnerabilities that result in 
hazards becoming disasters. His second model represented that uncertainty played a role in a 
disaster. His uncertainty had a basis in the communication about, understanding of and 
acceptance of particular events. If there was poor communication about particular events or 
hazards within a community this would lead to an uncertainty or lack of understanding of the 
dangers of a those hazards. It was the lack of understanding that would lead to disasters (Gilbert 
1995).  Vulnerability and hazard are interwoven in the concept of “hazard of place.” The “hazard 
of place” describes the relationship between hazard and vulnerability from a geographical 
perspective. The “hazard of place” is defined as the geographical space a vulnerable population 
is located with respect to hazards and/or events that could occur at that place (Cutter 1996). 
Hewitt and Burton had discussed the “hazardousness of a place.” Their underlying theme was 
much different – they cataloged the hazards of London, Ontario to show that any place could be 
a dangerous place at any time (Hewitt and Burton 1971). 
This relationship among hazard, risk and vulnerability can be expressed as a pseudo-
mathematical expression: Disaster Risk = Hazards + Vulnerabilities. Where the magnitude of the 
risk of disaster can be related to the hazards of a place and the vulnerabilities of a population 
(Cova 1999). The relationship has been expanded and vulnerabilities was expanded to include 
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mitigation. The vulnerabilities factor was transformed to be defined as the inverse of resiliency 
of a population or community (Wisner, Gaillard, and Kelman 2012). Once the observation was 
made that disasters not only occur because of the risks caused by a hazard, but also by 
vulnerabilities of a community, the idea to identify those vulnerable populations was developed. 
Morrow proposed a system or model to map the vulnerabilities of communities using geographic 
information systems (Morrow 1999). The abilities to identify and map vulnerabilities led to the 
development of social vulnerability indices (Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 2003). However, with 
decades of analysis and techniques to develop these types of indices there has been no attempt to 
integrate that information into the planning of disaster relief supply chains. Much of the 
modeling done has used gross percentages of populations to develop the locations and demands 
required.  
In recent years, the United States government has taken a more comprehensive approach 
to disaster response and recovery. This approach is called the “all hazards” approach. The 
government takes a more encompassing approach in planning for disaster events. In this 
approach, the government weighs the potential for differing types of events and the associated 
risks of each event. Plans are then developed to include a wide range of hazards. These plans are 
more comprehensive and flexible. This allows communities to have one or two master type plans 
as oppose to numerous hazard specific plan for each individual hazard. The allows for a quick, 
scalable, adaptable response that will allow for a quicker recovery (“National Response 
Framework” 2008; “National Disaster Response Framework” 2011) 
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2.4 Equality vs Equity 
At the heart of public facilities, location analysis or model is the attempt for equality 
and/or equity in the distribution of public services. Planners attempt to balance the needs of a 
community, as a whole, versus the population that might need or utilize the desired facility. 
Drezner clearly describes the dilemma and concept: 
 “Why should a few users have a very short distance to a public facility, 
 Whereas many users have longer distances to travel (or vice versa)?” 
                                                                                                   (Drezner 2004) 
 
Drezner believes that facility location models in the public sector have an equity objective, and 
the aforementioned quote is a statement of the conflicts the concept of equity. However, the 
concepts of equity and equality tend to be co-mingled as a single concept or objective. Drezner 
examined these concepts in building models for casualty collection points for Los Angeles, and 
argues that location models that were attempts at equity models tended to have equality 
objectives (Drezner 2004). 
In 1969, McGuire and Garn examined the ability or the requirement to include equity 
considerations in the analysis of federally funded projects. In their analysis of the state of the 
situation, in 1969, they could not find a single unambiguous measure or meaning of poverty or 
community need, and without this type of measure or definition, they argued that many local 
planners had to interpret how programs fit the needs of their communities. Generally, local 
officials were confronted with programs that may have been designed as “a one size fits all,” or 
“a shotgun approach.” McGuire and Garn believed that there was a need to measure a 
community’s “need” on some universal scale and such a scale or metric could help determine the 
distribution of such federal programs (McGuire and Garn 1969). 
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Savas examined three metrics to measure the ability to deliver public services. He 
believed that the delivery of such services could be measured by efficiency, effectiveness, and 
equity. He described equity as fairness, impartiality, and equality of services. He introduced the 
concept of equality in his belief of how public services should be distributed. He argued that the 
distribution of public services could be done by following one or more of four formulas. The first 
formula was the use of equal payments, where the payments could be equal payments for equal 
amounts of services or equal payments for the equal ability to pay for such services. The second 
formula was equal output. Programs are distributed in such a manner that all communities have 
equal results. The third formula focuses on the equality of inputs. Communities all receive the 
same level of inputs, and the input is measured against some scale such as per capita, per district, 
or per some areal unit. His fourth formula was not as straightforward as his other three formulas. 
He described it as the equal satisfaction of demand, and it could be described as “being the 
squeaky wheel.” The fourth formula is equal satisfaction of demand and could be implemented 
as equal inputs per unit of demand. An example of this would be assigning one police car for 
every 1,000 calls per year. Savas further develops the fourth formula such that it could be 
measured as equal inputs per complaint or equal inputs per politically weighted complaints – 
“the squeaky wheel” (Savas 1978). 
Schilling and Marsh argue that the earliest and most frequently used measure of equity is 
an attempt to maximize the effect over a group or location. They define equity as when each 
group receives a fair share of services provided by the location of public facility. They discuss 
twenty approaches to the measure of equity, but they believe that there is little agreement on 
which ones are the most effective measurements. They note that this measure of equity is used as 
an objective for the p-center model. The p-center model has the objective to locate p facilities 
 
 
27 
 
that minimize the maximum distance from a demand node. They observe that the p-center is 
more equitable than the p-median model, which attempts to minimize travel distance (Marsh and 
Schilling 1994). Building on Marsh and Schilling’s work, Ogryczak examined the ability to build 
the ideas of inequality measures and equity into location models. He focused on bicriteria models 
and examined the use of several inequality measures such as maximum deviation, mean 
deviation, and mean difference. These measure were used to incorporate equity factors into 
facility location models (Ogryczak 2000).  
According to Morrill and Symons the comparison between efficiency and the idea of 
distributional equity, concerning, a location is not so clear. They argue that the idea of equity 
was absent from classical location theory. They believe that the idea of measuring equity only 
arises when a community believes that some population or location is not receiving fair or 
adequate services. However, they cannot pinpoint whether the observed inequity is the result of 
some economic inefficiency or an inefficiency of the goals (Morrill and Symons 1977). 
Leventhal believes that equity theory uses a unidimensional rather than a multidimensional 
approach, and considers only the final distribution, or reward, of goods and services. He 
comments that equity theory exaggerates the importance of fairness (Leventhal 1980). 
2.5 Location-Allocation Models 
Planners are confronted with the problem of accessibility of services. In the public sector, 
these types of services can be things like schools, emergency services of various types, courts or 
motor vehicle licensing centers. Similarly, locations of things like warehouses, service or repair 
centers or branch offices can be types of locations in the private sector in which accessibility is 
important. The factor of accessibility is measured by some metric such as travel distance or 
travel time, or in the case of a commercial setting travel or transportation costs. Accessibility 
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becomes important because if the facility is located such that it is too demanding for the public 
or the customer to reach it, the facility will not be useful. 
In the simplest form, this type of problem is a Weber problem. Weber was able to 
demonstrate that a factory will locate itself in a manner as to minimize the transportation costs 
for raw materials and to the final customer (D. M. Smith 1981). However, when there are 
multiple facilities to locate the system becomes much more complex. The system will have to 
provide a particular service using multiple facilities. These facilities have to be located in a way 
as to meet the demands of the public or customer. Those demands must also be met within a set 
of constraints established by the planners. These types of systems are location-allocation models. 
Further complexity arises because facilities in an optimal multi-facility network or pattern have 
to be selected simultaneously rather than choosing one location at a time. Church and Murray 
calls this their Third Law of Location Science (Church and Murray 2009). 
The process of allocation also reinforces the differences between a single facility system 
and a multi-facility system. Allocation is the process of determining who is served by a facility. 
Allocation splits up the demand between the different facilities. Thus, in a location-allocation 
model not only do the set of facilities have to be selected simultaneously, but also the allocation 
of the demand to each facility in the system. In other words as a facility is located it is given its 
associated demand for that particular location. 
In 1958, Baumol and Wolfe proposed a solution to the warehouse-location problem. 
Their innovative approach broke the problem down into two transportation problems: (1) from 
the factory to warehouse and (2) from the warehouse to the customer location. Additionally, the 
confronted both the assumption of linearity and the possibility of nonlinearity within their 
development of a solution. They also presented another simplification of aggregating locations 
 
 
29 
 
within a city, i.e. all the warehouses located within New York City were considered to be located 
in a single location (Baumol and Wolfe 1958). Following in 1963, Leon Cooper developed a 
framework for a solution for the location-allocation problem. He stated the general form of the 
problem. He said that the problem began with three givens: (1) location of each destination 
(customer); (2) the requirements (demand) of each destination (customer); and (3) shipping costs 
for the region. Cooper’s method would then solve for: the number of sources (facilities); the 
location of each source; and capacity (supply) of each source (Cooper 1963). About the same 
time as Cooper Kuehn and Hamburger developed a heuristic program that located or selected 
potential warehouse sites. Their work differed from Baumol and Wolfe in that their program was 
able to consider many more potential warehouse locations (Kuehn and Hamburger 1963). Haley 
also offered a unique approach. He described the warehouse siting problem as a mechanical or 
physics analogue. He described demand as weight in the system and that the optimal solution 
was when the system came to rest. According to Haley the system had the minimum amount of 
potential energy (Haley 1963). Hakimi attached the sources and destinations to a network 
system. Hakimi was optimizing the location of telephone switching centers on a communication 
network, but he saw his solution analogous to locating police or fire stations on a road network. 
He used the two examples, the telephone switching and police stations, to differentiate between 
centers and medians of a graph. Hakimi’s police station example would introduce a class of 
location-allocation problems known as p-median problems (Hakimi 1964). Goldman would 
examine Hakimi’s work from a different perspective. Where Hakimi believed that one only 
needed to consider vertices as location for centers, Goldman was able to minimize transportation 
costs over a set of origin-destination pairs, and not necessarily all centers located at a vertex. 
Goldman’s work would form the basis for hub-and-spoke models (Goldman 1969). 
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In a p-median problem, each demand is allocated once. The demand is restricted to 
locations that have been determined to be facilities. Additionally, the entire demand from a 
location will be assigned to the closest facility. ReVelle and Swain presented a mathematical 
formulation of the p-median problem. Their formulation allowed for linear programming 
techniques to be used to solve the location-allocation problems for what they called “central 
facilities” (ReVelle and Swain 1970). 
 
Figure2.3 Spider diagram of p-Median model. 
Some of the earliest uses for the location models were for the siting of emergency 
services (Revelle, Marks, and Liebman 1970). Location analysis and location-allocation models 
were used in the private sector or in commercial settings and the constraints between public and 
private models are slightly different. One such difference is the subtly between “best” and 
“optimal” parameters – this difference can lead to looking for surrogates to measure or quantify 
social utility (Toregas and ReVelle 1972). There have been models developed for public 
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facilities that are similar to private facilities in that both construction costs and transportation 
costs have been included in the objective function (Wagner and Falkson 1975). Location-
allocation models have been examined as dynamic systems. This type of  modeling accounts for 
changes (or relocations of facilities) over time (Wesolowsky and Truscott 1975). Church and 
ReVelle examined the connections between set covering and p-median problems. Figure 2.3 
shows a p-median model, where p = 4. They observed that there exists computational and 
theoretical links between the two classes of models, and the p-median problem is general enough 
to solve most types of location models. The flexibility in the p-median problem can be achieved 
by changes in how the input data is formatted (Church and ReVelle 1976). 
As disaster relief and recovery requirements become more complex the need for flexible 
relief supply choices becomes important. Haghani and Oh examined the problem of logistics 
from a network flow perspective. Their examination was with the belief that the transportation 
network framework was already in place – choices within their system were based on time and 
transportation types (Haghani and Oh 1996). During most disaster events the relief and supply 
centers have to be located (Dekle et al. 2005). Location-allocation models allow for the 
simultaneous location of centers and assignment of demand. Top-down and p-median type 
solutions have been offered to the relief supply chain problem (Horner and Downs 2007; Horner 
and Downs 2010; Widener and Horner 2011). 
Goldman’s work would set the foundation for the development of the analysis of hub-
and-spoke models. Working separately, Campbell and O’Kelly examined the hub-and-spoke 
location-allocation model (O’Kelly 1986b; O’Kelly 1986a; O’Kelly 1987; O’Kelly 1992; 
O’Kelly 1998; Campbell 1994; Campbell 1996). In this model, a hub can be considered a trans-
shipment location, and Figure 2.4 shows a schematic of a hub and spoke system. An advantage 
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of this system is a large number of direct connections can be replaced with fewer indirect 
connections (O’Kelly and Miller 1994). The hubs have the ability to interact with each other 
(O’Kelly 1986b). The interactions between the hubs could possibly allow supplies to enter the 
network at any point (hub) in the system. The network could also be designed such that hubs 
could accommodate routing algorithms from the hubs. These routing algorithms are extremely 
complex and computer resource intensive to solve. (Liu, Li, and Chan 2003). 
 
Figure 2.4 Hub and spoke arrangement. 
Hub networks allow for the modeling of two-way traffic along the network – a first step 
to multicommodity flow. The classic analogy, for a hub system, is airline passenger or freight 
travel. There are disadvantages to the use of hub systems. The first is that the formulation of a 
hub network requires a shift in thinking. The classical models discussed are demand focused. 
These models try to attempt to cover a demand location or meet the demand represented by a 
location in space. A hub network is concerned about the flow between an origin—destination 
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pair. In a hub network these pairs are linked as a unit – passengers wanting to go from point A to 
point B want only those beginning and ending points. Whereas in a classical p – median model 
the demand a point A does not care from where the demand is met. The second disadvantage is 
that attempting to formulate hub networks is a complex modeling task. Campbell and O’Kelly 
use differing methods. Campbell presents an integer linear programming method, and O’Kelly a 
quadratic method. The differences between the two are beyond the scope of this research, but 
each method appears to work equally as well. Each method results in complex computational 
methods where the number of decision variables can quickly expand beyond available computer 
hardware and software performance and memory. This limitation generally requires that the sets 
of origin—destination pairs be small, in the order of less than 50, and a small number of eventual 
hub locations(Daskin 2013). 
2.6 Use of Optimization in Disaster Management 
Four foundational articles about the use of optimization and location allocation models 
for in disaster management help outline the research. Altay and Green offer an overview of the 
state of disaster management research in the field of operations research. They discuss many 
articles within several areas of emergency/disaster management. They do not offer many 
examples of past study in disaster relief optimization, but they do argue that existing location 
allocation models can be improved for emergency services and adapted for disaster situations 
(Altay and Green 2006). 
Kovacs and Spens conducted a review of disaster logistics for the same period as Altay 
and Green. They believed, as Altay and Green, that the field was relatively new, and had many 
areas in which it could grow (Kovács and Spens 2007). Covering a later period is Caunhy, et al. 
Their work covered the use of optimization of logistic models for emergency situations. They 
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explained that optimization models were initially used to develop locations for oil spill and 
similar maritime disaster response teams in the 1970’s, and that in the 1980’s these models were 
expanded to such things as hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. They reviewed models that were 
similar to this research. They found that the facility location researched generally formulated 
models that were of the maximal covering type, and the models had either quantity of coverage 
or quality of coverage requirements. Models could either have deterministic or stochastic 
parameters. The stochastic parameters were either probabilistic or scenario based. Their research 
found single level and bi-level models. A bi-level model is described as having a leader and a 
follower in the decision making process, and these types of models can introduce differing levels 
of information at different stages of the decision making process. They found that when simple 
facility location models were expanded the resulting expansion included things like relief 
distribution and/or stock pre-positioning into the models. They also found models that dealt with 
unmet demands, facility expansion, different types or levels of facilities, and other factors such 
as ordering costs, holding costs, and facility operation costs (Caunhye, Nie, and Pokharel 2012). 
A model similar to this research by Horner and Downs (Horner and Downs 2010) was 
classified by Caunhye, et al as a single objective, deterministic, single level facility location 
model. They also acknowledge that the Horner and Downs model locates different types of 
facilities. Caunhye, et al found two multiobjective models (Caunhye, Nie, and Pokharel 2012). 
The first being a partial covering solution to locating oil spill response teams (Belardo et al. 
1984). The second model optimized the location of pre-positioned medical supplies and the 
distribution of such. This model is an example of a bi-level model – the second objective the 
distribution of the supplies builds on the first objective – the location of warehouse/stockpiles. 
The model has stochastic parameters developed from a scenario of a Seattle, WA earthquake 
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(Mete and Zabinsky 2010). Ransikarbum and Mason explain the use of FEMA’s HAZUS 
software to develop a scenario to test their Goal programming method (Ransikarbum and Mason 
2016). 
In a more recent article, Gutjahr and Nolz examined the use of multicriteria optimization. 
They found a growing use of multicriteria optimization techniques in developing disaster relief 
logistics. They believed that this increase in the use of multicriteria optimizations was because 
the management of disasters requires the balancing of many objectives. They discussed the use 
of models that examined various factors that could be used as either objectives or constraints. 
These factors included costs, travel distance, coverage, reliability, security, and distress. They 
found various techniques were being used to develop such models. They could not find much 
discussion about equity measures, or the examination of tradeoffs. They believed that future 
research is required in the examination in differing demand needs based on measures of equity 
and equality (Gutjahr and Nolz 2016). 
 
2.7 Summary 
A disaster is complex event that may combine many natural, technological and social 
factors to cause damage or disruption to a community. Disasters do occur within definable time 
and space boundaries. The complicated and unpredictable nature, of disasters, calls for flexible 
response and recovery systems. Location allocation models allow planners to propose and 
develop adaptable models for locating public facilities to maximize social utility. The use of 
multcriteria models can allow planners to weigh competing objectives against each other. This 
type of modeling should allow for a more focused distribution points. 
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The ability to integrate information about a location’s vulnerabilities into a model would 
allow planners to better understand the needs of a location during times of crisis. Having a better 
understanding of a location’s needs allows for a better disaster relief supply chain. The strength 
and performance of the chain is influenced by how well the anticipated needs are met by the 
supply chain. .The chain can be made more flexible by taking the established system and 
transforming it into a hub network, which will allow for two-way and/or multicommodity flow. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Methodology and Model Development 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed much of today’s research and policy in disasters and disaster response, in 
the United States, has its foundation in research that occurred in the post- World War II and Cold 
War era. Not more so is the historical foundations evident than in the manner in which disaster 
relief is distributed. The current systems are heavily reliant on a top-down, automobile centric 
approach to distribution. Relief supplies and equipment are stored at large centrally located 
warehouses, in some cases there are smaller intermediary regional facilities, and moved to Points 
of Distribution (POD) for distribution to those who need the supplies. The POD is designed to be 
a “drive thru” facility where persons requiring supplies enters at one end, in a vehicle, and exits 
at another end with the needed supplies. This process is shown in Figure 3.1; vehicles enter from 
the left in the diagram, and exit at the right with loading points for various supplies along the 
path. Figure 3.2 outlines the relative land area requirements for the various types of distribution 
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facilities. The distribution model based on “pushing” down the required supplies to a location to 
which the requiring population must travel to receive the supplies. These facilities require a large 
expense in land area, manpower, and money to establish and operate that these facilities tend to 
be located a distance away that does require the reliance of a motor vehicle to receive assistance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Diagram of Point of Distribution.  LP = Loading points (FEMA/USACE 2008). 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Relative area requirements for the different distribution levels as suggested by the 
State of Florida and FEMA (“County Points of Distribution PowerPoint” 2010). 
  
Horner and Downs (Horner and Downs 2007) proposed a model in which goods went 
from a large warehouse to a POD and then a Bulk-Breakout Point (BBP). This system is 
analogous to one that is used by less-than-load (LTL) shipping systems, and is shown in Figure 
3.3. 
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Figure 3.3 Schematic of Horner and Downs model (Horner and Downs 2007). BOBs are 
equivalent to the proposed BBPs. 
The Horner and Downs model relies the same “push” driver to get supplies to the populations 
that need them. Horner and Downs rely on the metric of minimizing the total demand weighted 
cost in the system (using distance as the costing factor) in making the decision as to where to 
locate a facility. 
 This research’s model is similar to the Horner and Downs model in that it takes a 
multiobjective approach to solve the problem. The Horner and Downs model is a two objective 
model. The first objective determines which POD serves which BBP, and the second objective 
determines the locations of the BBP. The model attempts to minimize the costs within the 
system. The proposed model will build upon minimizing the total demand weighted costs, and it 
will take into account the desire to maximize coverage of more vulnerable neighborhoods. 
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3.2 Model Development 
 
Cohon points out that one of the jobs of an analyst is to narrow the choices for decision 
makers. He believes that multiobjective modeling allows for such a process to occur (Cohon 
2003). That process also allows for the modeling to broken down into smaller pieces to help 
determine the bounds and limits of the final solution. The first step in the process is to layout the 
objectives of the model or what goals are going to be achieved by the model. In this model, there 
will be three objectives. The first objective will involve the relationship between the PODs and 
the BBPs. This objective will be a straightforward cost-minimizing objective. The next two 
objectives of the model concern the BBP-neighborhood system. These two objectives are the 
more complex, and are listed below: 
1. To maximize the coverage of the “more” vulnerable neighborhoods 
2. To minimize the total demand weighted cost in the BBP-neighborhood system. 
What is first observed by the objectives is that they are in conflict with each other. The 
first objective is a maximization and the second is a minimization. This is a simple conflict to 
resolve when one considers that a maximization can become a minimization objective by taking 
the negative of objective (Cohon 2003). However, the use of negative values could lead to errors 
or confusion in the results and analyst. A convention suggested by Daskin (Daskin 2013) is used 
to change the first objective to: 
1. Minimize the uncovered “more” vulnerable neighborhoods. 
This will result in a change the formulation of the coverage matrix as follows: 
 
                 Cij =  
 
1, if distji > coverage distance and  
    neighborhood is “more” vulnerable; 
 
0,  Otherwise. 
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Planners and analysts decide upon the value of the “coverage distance”. This value represents the 
distance within which planners determined acceptable service can be provided. Distji is the 
distance from a node, j, requiring service and a node, i, providing the service. This formulation is 
the same as the formulation that was proposed by Church and ReVelle in their discussion about 
the computational links between the Maximal Covering Problem and the p-Median problem 
(Church and ReVelle 1976). 
 
3.3 Determining the Bounds and Limitations 
Prior to developing a complete outline of a model, an analyst has to determine or 
understand the possible bounds and limitations of any solutions. An approach to examine this 
issue is to analyze the problem using smaller, less complex fundamental models. In this case, this 
specific problem is examined using the three fundamental models: 
1. Set Covering Model 
2. Maximal Covering Model 
3. p-Median Model 
The Set Covering Model is considered the fundamental model in solving for public 
facilities locations. The objective of this model, first proposed by Toregas, Swain, ReVelle, and 
Bergman (Toregas et al. 1971), is to locate a minimum number of facilities that satisfy a 
response-time or distant requirement. The model can be stated as: 
Minimize:   
∑j in J  aj  Xj  (3.1) 
   
Subject to:   
   
∑j in J  Cij  Xj  ≥ 1 for all i (3.2) 
Xj  = 0,1 for all j  (3.3) 
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Where:   
Cij =  
 
Xj = 
 
  
  
aj =  Cost of operating/locating BBP at candidate site j (will be set to $1 
in this case). 
  
 
 
In the context of this problem, the Set Covering Model will give a starting point or an 
indication of the upper bound for the number of required BBPs to serve the BBP-neighborhood 
system. 
For development of the proposed model, a randomly generated neighborhood system was 
created. The system was made of 150 neighborhoods, represented as points, located within an x-
y coordinate system. Additionally the points were randomly assigned either as “more” or “less” 
vulnerable, and the points were given a randomly created demand weight. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 
shows the randomly generated neighborhoods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1, if distij <= coverage distance; 
 
0, otherwise; 
1, if BBP is located at candidate site j; 
 
0, if not; and 
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Table 3.1 Sample of generated neighborhood parameters 
Name 
X-
Coordinate 
Y-
Coordinate 
Demand 
Operating 
Cost 
Vulnerability 
Level 
NH1 49.489 94.322 0.880 $1.00 More Vulnerable 
NH2 31.593 46.322 4.554 $1.00 Less Vulnerable 
NH3 31.446 72.684 17.670 $1.00 Less Vulnerable 
NH4 43.943 52.082 9.764 $1.00 Less Vulnerable 
NH5 48.386 1.913 17.209 $1.00 Less Vulnerable 
NH6 76.794 70.986 3.850 $1.00 Less Vulnerable 
NH7 20.544 46.405 14.147 $1.00 Less Vulnerable 
NH8 17.251 92.376 10.441 $1.00 Less Vulnerable 
NH9 29.037 59.778 4.591 $1.00 Less Vulnerable 
NH10 76.206 46.147 15.964 $1.00 Less Vulnerable 
. . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
NH145 49.147 81.033 15.183 $1.00 More Vulnerable 
NH146 40.230 57.559 7.508 $1.00 Less Vulnerable 
NH147 89.481 18.053 8.169 $1.00 Less Vulnerable 
NH148 27.722 32.383 10.801 $1.00 Less Vulnerable 
NH149 5.808 65.733 6.654 $1.00 More Vulnerable 
NH150 57.378 21.085 21.876 $1.00 More Vulnerable 
 
 
Table 3.2 Totals of Types of Generated Neighborhoods 
 Count Demand 
Less Vulnerable Neighborhoods 64 701.493 
More Vulnerable Neighborhoods 86 979.735 
Total 150 1681.228 
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Figure 3.4 Randomly Generated Neighborhoods 
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Figure 3.5 Randomly Generated Neighborhoods with generated demand. 
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The resulting solution for the Set Covering Model located thirty-one facilities as BBPs 
for the neighborhood system is shown in Figure 3.6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Solution to the Set Covering Problem. Note: Blue circle outlines represent relative 
coverage areas. 
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The “true” model located in total thirty-three BBPs, as seen in Table 3.3, but two of the locations 
NH49 and NH27 only service themselves. So, those locations were considered uncovered for this 
analysis. Therefore, the Set Covering solution produces an upper bound of thirty-one BBPs using 
a “coverage distance” of 10 distance units. Those thirty-one BBPs covered 98.52% of the total 
demand (with 98.67% of the neighborhoods covered), this result is summarized in Table 3.4. The 
model had an average distance of 6.67 distance units from covered neighborhood to BBP, and 
the distances for the various neighborhood types is shown in Figure 3.7. One drawback of the 
solution was that fifteen neighborhoods were covered, or serviced, by more than one BBP.  
 
 
Figure 3.7 Box plots of distance from neighborhood to BBP.  
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Table 3.3 Bulk Break Points Selected by Set Covering Model 
Bulk Breakout Point X- Coordinate Y-Coordinate 
 
NH8 17.251 92.376 
 NH9 29.037 59.778 
 NH11 20.314 19.411 
 NH12 51.461 10.140 
 NH15 26.458 69.397 
 NH20 68.857 54.385 
 NH25 62.372 28.944 
 NH26 32.592 7.921 
 NH27 0.172 36.196 * 
NH28 88.930 95.359 
 NH30 9.970 29.152 
 NH39 63.221 79.009 
 NH41 54.939 40.977 
 NH45 74.563 88.968 
 NH49 1.299 88.082 * 
NH50 87.645 46.342 
 NH59 9.914 4.097 
 NH70 69.263 4.643 
 NH72 9.545 57.169 
 NH75 40.036 26.775 
 NH80 81.797 76.790 
 NH85 77.039 17.945 
 NH90 81.060 64.859 
 NH92 88.515 28.671 
 NH95 98.842 17.469 
 NH99 83.330 6.954 
 NH110 70.147 48.143 
 NH115 44.760 79.976 
 NH116 25.205 38.561 
 NH121 49.276 61.292 
 NH126 58.379 96.905 
 NH140 38.976 43.460 
 NH141 28.475 87.213 
 
    * Only cover themselves 
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Table 3.4 Coverage Determined by Set Covering Model Solution 
 
Covered 
Percent 
Covered 
Demand 
Covered 
Percent 
Demand 
Covered 
Less Vulnerable 
64 100 701.493 100 
More Vulnerable 
84 97.67 954.795 97.46 
All Neighborhoods 
148 98.67 1656.228 98.52 
 
The Set Covering model offers the first dilemma for decision makers. The solution 
provides for almost total coverage, well within the coverage requirement of 10 distance units, 
using 31 BBPs. But, what if the daily cost to operate a BBP was $1,000? That is $31,000 per day 
over the course of the recovery – which in a post Hurricane Katrina and Sandy world could be 
weeks to months in time. What if planners had a budget for only half that many BBPs? 
Church and ReVelle examined that similar scenario when they developed the Maximal 
Covering model (Church and ReVelle 1974). In a variation to the usual formulation to the 
Maximal Covering model, the BBP-neighborhood system was examined using a covering matrix 
formulation that gave weight to the vulnerability type of the neighborhood. Recalling that when 
the neighborhood system was generated each neighborhood was given the following assignment: 
 1 = “more” vulnerable neighborhood 
 0 = “less” vulnerable neighborhood 
And, the definitions of “coverage distance” and distji are the same as previously discussed. 
Therefore, the coverage matrix can be stated as: 
 
                 Cij =  
1, if distji <=coverage distance and vulnerability = 1; 
 
0, Otherwise. 
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The Maximal Covering problem can be stated as follows: 
Maximize:   
∑i in I  di  Xi  (3.4) 
   
Subject to:   
   
∑j in J  Cij  Yj  ≥ Xi for all i (3.5) 
∑j in J Yj = p  (3.6) 
Xi  = 0,1 for all i  (3.7) 
Yj = 0,1  for all j (3.8) 
   
Where:   
cij =  
 
Xi = 
 
Yj =  
 
di = demand at neighborhood i;and 
p =  number of BBPs to locate. 
 
In the case of the BBP-neighborhood system, the “coverage distance” was set to a value 
of 10 distance units. The Maximal Covering Problem was solved using p=15 to maximize the 
coverage of the “more” vulnerable neighborhoods using fifteen BBPs. The model produced the 
resulting solution, shown in Figure 3.8 and Table 3.5: Figure 3.9 summarizes the distances of the 
two types of neighborhoods. 
1, if distji  <= coverage distance and vulnerability 
=1; 
0, otherwise; 
1, if neighborhood i is covered; 
 
0, if not;  
1, if BBP is located at site j; 
 
0, if not;   
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Figure 3.8 Coverage Diagram of Maximal Covering Solution. p=15  
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The solution found that the maximum demand covered for the “more” vulnerable 
neighborhoods is 826.87 or 84.4% of the total demand for the “more” vulnerable neighborhoods. 
Sixty-one or 70.93% of the “more” vulnerable neighborhoods were covered. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Box plot of distance for Maximal Covering Problem. 
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Table 3.5 Bulk Breakout Points Selected by Maximal Covering solution 
BBP X-Coordinate Y-Coordinate 
NH3 31.446 72.684 
NH26 32.592 7.921 
NH28 88.931 95.359 
NH40 85.129 22.668 
NH56 89.501 52.374 
NH61 64.586 41.841 
NH81 68.155 82.554 
NH100 55.660 29.087 
NH105 41.152 17.163 
NH113 67.831 61.687 
NH119 86.123 68.365 
NH123 76.523 3.745 
NH136 45.175 50.927 
NH142 17.903 25.709 
NH145 49.147 81.033 
 
Table 3.6 Coverage Determined by Maximal Covering Model Solution 
 
Covered 
Percent 
Covered 
Demand 
Covered 
Percent 
Demand 
Covered 
Average 
Distance 
to BBP 
Less Vulnerable 29 45.31 302.869 43.17 5.209 
More Vulnerable 61 70.93 826.874 84.41 6.17 
Total Neighborhoods 90 60 1129.743 67.20 7.037 
 
The solution found by the Maximal Covering Model offers the insight for the analyst that 
the coverage of a particular type of neighborhood can be influenced or controlled by the 
formulation of the model. Table 3.6 shows that more than twice as many “more” vulnerable 
neighborhoods are covered than “less” vulnerable neighborhoods using the weighting cover 
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matrix proposed. The Maximal Covering solution also indicates that a more in depth approach to 
the modeling has to occur. The results show that over 80% of the “more” vulnerable demand is 
covered, but less than 70% of total demand is covered. 
The final fundamental examination of the BBP-neighborhood system was done using the 
p-Median problem. The p-Median problem developed out of the formative work by Cooper and 
Hakimi, who worked independently (Cooper 1963; Hakimi 1964). As with the Maximal 
Covering problem, the p-Median problem uses a predefined number of facilities to locate. The 
model attempts to minimize the total demand weighted cost (or distance) in the system. The 
model can be formulated as such: 
Minimize:   
∑i in I ∑j in J  cij  di  Xi      
 
(3.9) 
Subject to:   
   
∑j in J  Xij  = 1 for all i (3.10) 
∑j in J Yj = p  (3.11) 
Xij – Yj ≤ 0 for all i and j  (3.12) 
Xi  = 0,1 for all i  (3.13) 
Yj = 0,1  for all j (3.14) 
Where:   
Xij = 
 
Yj =  
 
di = demand at neighborhood i; 
cij =  Distance between neighborhood i and BBP site j; and 
p =  number of BBPs to locate. 
1, if demand of neighborhood i is covered by BBP 
at j; 
 
0, if not;  
1, if BBP is located at site j; 
 
0, if not;   
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The p-Median solution for p =15 is shown in Figure 3.10. Figure 3.11 summarizes the 
distances for the model in box plots, and Tables 3.7 and 3.8 offer additional insights into the p-
median solution. By the nature of the p-Median formulation the model offers 100% coverage of 
the required demands.  
 
Table 3.7 Bulk Break Out Points selected by p-Median Model Solution, p=15 
BBP X-Coordinate Y-Coordinate 
NH13 79.780 13.857 
NH15 26.458 69.397 
NH18 80.376 71.991 
NH20 68.858 54.385 
NH22 68.883 96.660 
NH28 88.931 95.359 
NH49 1.299 88.082 
NH54 16.695 21.727 
NH58 36.852 1.259 
NH67 24.620 51.176 
NH78 62.054 79.510 
NH91 85.027 54.372 
NH103 46.703 47.306 
NH115 44.760 79.976 
NH150 57.378 21.085 
   
 
Table 3.8 Coverage Determined by p-Median Model Solution, p=15 
 
Covered 
Percent 
Covered 
Demand 
Covered 
Percent 
Demand 
Covered 
Average 
Distance 
to BBP 
Less Vulnerable 64 100 701.493 100 10.398 
More Vulnerable 86 100 979.635 100 10.144 
Total Neighborhoods 150 100 1681.128 100 10.251 
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Figure 3.10 Solution of p-Median solution with p=15. 
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Figure 3.11 Box plots of distance from neighborhoods to BBP. 
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The p-Median Model solution indicates that the “coverage distance” of 10 distance units 
for BBP to neighborhood is an acceptable parameter.  By adding one more BBP location, or 
assigning p=16, the average distance from BBP to neighborhood decreases to 10.021 distance 
units. This is a 2.24% decrease in the distance. The addition of additional two BBP locations, 
p=17, results in an average distance below 10 distance units or 9.639. This is a 5.97% reduction 
in the distance. Both p = 16 and p =17 are below the upper bound determined by the Set Cover 
Model solution of 31 BBPs. 
 
3.4 Building the Multiobjective Model 
 The proposed model encompasses three objectives. The complete model will look as 
follows: 
 
Q = 
Minimize the total distance 
weighted costs of POD-
BBP system 
+ Minimize uncovered more 
vulnerable demands 
+ 
Minimize total 
demand weighted 
costs in BBP-
neighborhood system 
 
 
 
The initial focus in this section will continue with the BBP-neighborhood system. Once the 
proposed model for the BBP – neighborhood system is formulated the objective for the POD – 
BBP system will be added to the model.  
For the time being the POD-BBP system objective will be dropped and result in a two 
objective model where the objectives of the BBP-neighborhood system are considered. 
Q1 = Vulnerable + Distance 
BBP-neighborhood system 
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And: 
Vulnerable  = k(∑i in I ∑j in J  di cij Xi) 
Distance  = (1-k)(∑i in I ∑j in J  di bij Xi) 
In the above expansion of the objectives Vulnerable and Distance a factor, k, is added to 
the formulations. This factor serves two purposes in the model. The first purpose is to allow the 
model to place emphasis on a particular objective over another. This allows planners to add or 
remove “importance” to particular objectives in the case of the proposed model the ability to 
minimize the uncovered “more” vulnerable neighborhoods is seen as more important than the 
Distance objective. The second purpose for k is to allow all the objectives to be expressed in the 
same units. In some multicriteria objective models some objectives are measured is distance or 
time and others are measured in the forms of resources such as dollars or labor requirements. 
(Cohon 2003).  
The BBP – neighborhood system in the proposed model can be expressed as: 
Minimize:   
      
k(∑i in I ∑j in J  di cij Xi) +  (1-k)(∑i in I ∑j in J  di bij Xi) 
 
(3.15) 
Subject to:   
   
∑j in J  Xij  = 1 for all i (3.16) 
∑j in J Yj = p  (3.17) 
Xij – Yj ≤ 0 for all i and j  (3.18) 
Xi  = 0,1 for all i  (3.19) 
Yj = 0,1  for all j (3.20) 
   
Where:   
Xij = 
 
1, if demand of neighborhood i is covered by BBP 
at j; 
 
0, if not;  
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Yj =  
 
di = demand at neighborhood i; 
cij =  
 
bij = distance from neighborhood i to BBP j; and 
p =  number of BBPs to locate. 
 
Where 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 representing all the neighborhoods, and 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽  representing the candidate sites for 
BBPs – in this model the set of neighborhoods also represents the set of all potential BBP sites. 
The definitions for “coverage distance” and distji are the same as previously established. 
Objective 3.15 minimizes the uncovered more vulnerable demands and the total demand 
weighted costs (or distance) in the BBP-neighborhood system. Constraint 3.16 requires that each 
demand location/neighborhood be assigned to exactly one facility/BBP. Constraint 3.17allows 
for exactly P number of facilities/BBPs to be located. The linking constraint is seen in 3.18. This 
constraint states that a demand location/neighborhood can only be assigned to a facility 
location/BBP if such a facility is located at that location. The standard integrality conditions are 
found in 3.19 and 3.20. 
Once the formulation of for the model is established the value for k can be determined. 
There are two methods to help determine k. The slope-line method is the first method that was 
used for this model. In the slope-line method k is determined by the slope of the line connecting 
two extreme points, and then the model is analyzed using that factor to determine intermediate 
points to determine additional lines and slopes (Daskin 2013). The slope—line procedure is 
1, if BBP is located at site j; 
 
0, if not;   
1, if distji  <= coverage distance and vulnerability 
=1; 
 
0, otherwise; 
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outlined in Figure 3.12.The weighting method uses a logical pattern of values to determine a 
value for k. In the proposed model’s case, the values for k were chosen to be between 0 and 1. 
As with the slope – line method the chosen values for k are put into the model and the resulting 
solutions are calculated. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 summarizes the determination of k by the two 
methods. 
 
Figure 3.12 Outlines the slope—line method to determine k (adapted from Daskin 2013) 
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Table 3.9 k factor determined by slope method 
Uncovered “more” 
vulnerable demand 
Average Distance  
BBP-neighborhood 
k 
152.762 7.202 1 
178.964 6.736 8.542 
222.964 6.112 4.106 
222.964 6.112 4.682 
305.461 6.426 0 
 
 
Table 3.10 k factor determined by weighting method 
Uncovered “more” 
vulnerable demand 
Average Distance  
BBP-neighborhood 
k 
152.762 7.202 1 
178.964 6.736 0.75 
222.964 6.612 0.5 
222.964 6.612 0.25 
305.461 6.426 0 
 
 
With the determination of the factor k completed, a tradeoff curve between the objectives 
is constructed. The tradeoff curve allows for the examination in the changes of one objective 
versus another objective. In the model as the amount of uncovered more vulnerable demand is 
decreased the average distance between the BBPs and the neighborhoods increases. In Figure 
3.13, a shaded area highlights the preferred solution region for the model using the random 
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generated data. The preferred solution region is determined by planners or analysts as a result 
their interpretation of the solutions of the model. This actual determination of k is a bit more art 
than hard determining mathematics. In a real world setting the stakeholders in the solution would 
be brought together to examine initial solutions, presented by the model, to determine this range. 
The competing objectives that would be put forth are: Do the stakeholders want a lower average 
distance to the BBP or do they want less uncovered “more” vulnerable neighborhoods? For 
further analysis of the model the amount of uncovered “more” vulnerable neighborhoods was 
chosen to be less than 220, and this results in a k of 0.75 – as determined by the weighted 
method. Figures 3.14 and 3.15 show the solutions for the model at the extreme values of k = 0 or 
k = 1. 
Figure 3.13 Tradeoff Curve for Objectives Vulnerable and Distance. 
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Figure 3.14 Solution for the BBP-neighborhood system with k=1. This is the same solution as 
found by the MCLP. This is represents the left extreme of the tradeoff curve. 
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Figure 3.15 This is the solution for the BBP-neighborhood system with k=0. This is the same 
result as the p-Median solution, and represents the extreme right side of the tradeoff curve. 
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After examining the tradeoff curve a weighting factor of 0.75 was selected to be used, 
and the objective can be seen as: 
Q1 = 0.75*(Vulnerable) + (1-0.75)*(Distance) 
 
Therefore, solving the model for p=15 results in the following BBPs being selected: 
Table 3.11 BBP selected by Model 
BBP 
X-
Coordinate 
Y-
Coordinate 
NH13 79.780 13.857 
NH15 26.458 69.397 
NH18 80.376 71.991 
NH20 68.858 54.385 
NH26 32.592 7.921 
NH28 88.931 95.359 
NH42 48.234 35.642 
NH49 1.299 88.082 
NH67 24.620 51.176 
NH78 62.054 79.510 
NH91 85.027 54.372 
NH115 44.760 79.976 
NH136 45.175 50.927 
NH142 17.903 25.709 
NH150 57.378 21.085 
 
The resulting solutions for the model are presented in Figures 3.16 and 3.17. Table 3.11 lists the 
BBPs as selected by the model. In Figure 3.16, the solution is examined as if the coverage 
restriction of 10 distance units is maintained on the located BBP. This is in fact a pseudo-
solution because the true model solution is similar to the p-Median problem solution as seen in 
Figure 3.10. However, this comparison allows for the examination of the average distance 
between BBP and neighborhood. With the coverage restriction in place the average distance is 
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just over 6.6 distance units for the “more” vulnerable neighborhoods. In the “true” solution to the 
model the average distance in the entire BBP-neighborhood system is 10.4 distance units. This is 
slightly above the 10-distance unit requirement. Figures 3.18 and 3.19 summarize the distances 
for the model solutions, of Figures 3.16 and 3.17, as box plots.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.16 BBP-neighborhood system with coverage restriction maintained. Coverage = 10 
distance units and p = 15. 
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Figure 3.17 BBP-neighborhood system without coverage restriction. p=15 
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Figure 3.18 Box Plot of model solution distance from BBP to Neighborhood (coverage 
restriction maintained) 
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Figure 3.19 Box Plot of distance from BBP to Neighborhood (coverage restriction not 
maintained) 
 
Tables 3.12 and 3.13 summarize solutions for the two model solutions shown in Figures 
3.15 and 3.16. If the model is analyzed as a coverage model, as in Table 3.12, only about 67% of 
the total demand is covered. In the complete solution, the model accounts for 100% coverage of 
the demand. This difference in analysis also accounts for the difference in average distances in 
the system observed. 
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Table 3.12 Model solution with coverage restriction maintained 
 
Covered 
Percent 
Covered 
Demand 
Covered 
Percent 
Demand 
Covered 
Average 
Distance 
to BBP 
Less Vulnerable 36 56.25 385.26 54.92 6.53 
More Vulnerable 55 63.95 756.67 77.24 6.61 
Total 
Neighborhoods 
91 60.67 1141.93 67.93 6.58 
 
Table 3.13 Model solution without coverage restriction (true solution) 
 
Covered 
Percent 
Covered 
Demand 
Covered 
Percent 
Demand 
Covered 
Average 
Distance 
to BBP 
Less Vulnerable 64 100 701.49 100 10.40 
More Vulnerable 86 100 979.64 100 10.41 
Total 
Neighborhoods 
150 100 1681.13 100 10.40 
 
One of the advantages of solving multiobjective problems, as presented in this research, 
is the ability to add or remove objectives in a logical, straightforward manner. The discussion, up 
to this point, has been focused on the BBP – neighborhood system objectives (Q1). A third 
objective of the model is the POD – BBP system. Adding the POD – BBP system objective 
results in the following formulation: 
 
Minimize Q =kfull Q2  + (1-kfull)Q1 
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Where: 
Q2 = ∑n in N ∑j in J  enj on X2nj POD to BBP system 
   
Q1 = 
k(∑i in I ∑j in J  di cij X1i)  + 
BBP to Neighborhood system 
(1-k)(∑i in I ∑j in J  di bij X1i) 
 
The resulting formulation: 
Minimize:   
      
                   ∑n in N ∑j in J  enj onj X2nj +  
                  k ∑i in I ∑j in J  di cij X1i +   
                  (1-k) ∑i in I ∑j in J  di bij X1i 
 
 
(3.21) 
   
Subject to:   
   
∑j in J  Xij  = 1 for all i (3.22) 
∑j in J Yj = p  (3.23) 
Xij – Yj ≤ 0 for all i and j  (3.24) 
∑n in N X2nj  = Yj for all j (3.25) 
X1ij  = 0,1 for all i  (3.26) 
X2nj = 0,1 for all n and j (3.27) 
Yj = 0,1  for all j (3.28) 
 
 
 
  
   
Where:   
cij = 
 
X1ij = 
 
1, if demand of neighborhood i is covered by BBP 
at j; 
 
0, if not;  
1, if distji  > coverage distance and neighborhood is 
“more vulnerable; 
 
0, if not;  
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X2nj = 
 
Yj =  
 
bij = distance from neighborhood i to BBP j;  
di = demand at neighborhood i; 
enj = distance between BBP at j and POD at n; 
on = operating cost of POD at location n; and 
p =  number of BBPs to locate. 
 
The POD-BBP-neighborhood system is a transshipment model. The objective 3.21 
minimizes: 
1. The economic cost weighted distance between the PODs and BBPs. 
2. The uncovered “more” vulnerable demands. 
3. The demand weighted distance between BBPs and neighborhoods. 
The set of PODs, N, are predetermined outside of the model – there is no restriction on the 
number of PODs utilized by the model. The set of neighborhoods, I, requires that each 
neighborhood’s demand is aggregated at a point. The set of BBPs, J, is chosen from the set of 
neighborhoods. Constraint 3.22 limits that a neighborhood is only assigned to one BBP. 
Constraint 3.23 assures that only p number of BBPs are sited. Constraint 3.24 is a linking 
constraint that stipulates that a neighborhood must be designated a BBP to service other 
neighborhoods. Constraint 3.25 only allows PODs to service actual BBPs. Constraints 3.26-3.28 
are the usual integrality constraints. 
1, if BBP is located at site j; 
 
0, if not;   
1, if BBP j   is covered by POD at n; 
 
0, if not;  
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To examine the full model PODs were randomly generated and added to the randomly 
generated neighborhoods (Figure 3.20): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.20 Randomly generated PODs are added to the randomly generated neighborhoods. 
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As with the BBP-neighborhood system, the value for kfull was determined for the full 
model. The examination of values of kfull allowed for the selection of 0.5 as an appropriate value 
and this summarized in Table 3.14. Since, kfull was chosen to be the value 0.5 the factor can be 
dropped from the model formulation because kfull equals 1 – kfull giving equal weight to each 
objective Q1 and Q2 .  
 
Table 3.14 Determining kfull for full model 
k Average 
Distance (POD-
BBP) 
Average 
Distance (BBP-
neighborhood) 
Average 
Distance (BBP-
More 
vulnerable) 
Average 
Distance 
(BBP-Less 
vulnerable) 
1 57.28 10.4 10.41 10.4 
0.75 21.09 10.4 10.41 10.4 
0.5 19.83 10.1 10.3 9.9 
0.25 18.09 10.2 10.46 9.85 
0 4.27 49.4 50.89 47.36 
 
The full model was then solved using p=15 and 10 randomly generated locations for the 
POD locations. The model produced the following solution from those parameters (Figure 3.21): 
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Figure 3.21 The model solution with p=15 
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Figure 3.22 The model solution for p=16. 
The model only utilizes eight out of the ten available POD for the solution. The model 
was run an additional time – this time p=16 and all other parameters and data remained the same. 
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With p=16 the average distances from the BBP to the differing types of neighborhoods was 
below 10 distance units (Figure 3.22). Table 3.15 summarizes the comparison between p=15 
solution and p=16 solution. 
 
Table 3.15 Resulting Average Distances p=15 versus p=16 
 Average Distance 
BBP to Less 
Vulnerable 
Average Distance 
BBP to More 
Vulnerable 
Average Distance 
BBP to any type 
neighborhood 
Average 
Distance POD 
to BBP 
p = 15 9.9 10.3 10.1 19.8 
p = 16 9.9 9.8 9.8 19.1 
 
3.5 Additional Refinement to the Model 
One of the objectives/goals of the model is to minimize the uncovered “more” vulnerable 
demands a closer look as to how the BBPs were chosen by the model was analyzed. This was 
done because if the model could make a “more” vulnerable neighborhood its first choice in 
selecting a BBP location it would help in minimizing the uncovered “more” vulnerable demands. 
The randomly generated demands were ranked by the cumulative percentage of the total demand 
in the system.  Table 3.16 lists the cumulative percentage ranking of the demands within the 
model-testing universe. The demand value was then assigned as “more” or “less” vulnerable. 
The demands were assigned in a way to favor one vulnerability level or another. For example, in 
the first run all 86 “more” vulnerable neighborhoods were assigned the top or largest 86 demand 
levels. This created a scenario in which 57.33% of the total demand was assigned to the “more” 
vulnerable locations. Two separate testing sets of neighborhoods were determined. The first set 
was done randomly. In the random set the demand, with its assigned vulnerability level, was 
assigned a location chosen randomly from the existing generated neighborhood universe. The 
 
 
80 
 
second set was created by assigning the demand, with its vulnerability level, done sequentially 
by the neighborhood naming convention. The model was then run for the different types of 
location assignments. The randomly assigned locations were run three times because each run 
produced different locations. Tables 3.17 and 3.18 list examples of randomly and sequentially 
assigned demands. The sequentially assigned locations were run just once because those 
locations did not change. The model showed a tendency to locate the most BBPs at 
neighborhoods with the vulnerability levels that commanded the highest demand levels, but it did 
not assign all BBPs to that vulnerability level.  Table 3.19 summarizes the results of the testing 
of the model. 
Table 3.16 Ranking of Demand 
Demand Cumulative Percent 
0.043 0.67 
0.325 1.33 
0.407 2 
0.478 2.67 
0.656 3.33 
0.880 4 
0.919 4.67 
1.278 5.33 
1.496 6 
1.917 6.67 
1.980 7.33 
2.410 8 
2.493 8.67 
2.535 9.33 
3.464 10 
. . 
. . 
. . 
24.488 98.67 
24.862 99.33 
24.994 100 
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Table 3.17 Sequentially Assigned Demands 
Name X-Coordinate Y-Coordinate Demand Vulnerability Level 
NH1 49.49 94.32 13.73 Less Vulnerable 
NH2 3.52 31.59 13.85 Less Vulnerable 
NH3 46.32 18.22 14.15 Less Vulnerable 
NH4 31.45 72.68 14.72 Less Vulnerable 
NH5 70.68 43.94 14.85 Less Vulnerable 
. . . . . 
. . . . . 
. . . . . 
NH146 16.37 74.53 13.09 More Vulnerable 
NH147 97.34 28.02 13.24 More Vulnerable 
NH148 83.33 6.95 13.54 More Vulnerable 
NH149 70.49 55.66 13.59 More Vulnerable 
NH150 29.09 36.82 13.60 More Vulnerable 
 
 
Table 3.18 Example of Randomly Assigned Demands 
Name X-Coordinate Y-Coordinate Demand Vulnerability Level 
NH95 40.19 82.11 13.73 Less Vulnerable 
NH110 29.02 37.12 13.85 Less Vulnerable 
NH133 68.18 39.72 14.15 Less Vulnerable 
NH12 92.38 41.76 14.72 Less Vulnerable 
NH137 65.27 88.51 14.85 Less Vulnerable 
. . . . . 
. . . . . 
. . . . . 
NH107 45.88 9.54 13.09 More Vulnerable 
NH74 95.68 87.64 13.24 More Vulnerable 
NH104 74.45 69.26 13.54 More Vulnerable 
NH101 77.66 38.40 13.59 More Vulnerable 
NH109 89.28 69.68 13.60 More Vulnerable 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
 
Table 3.19 Sample results of demand loading analysis 
Top 57.33%* of Demand Assigned to "More" 
Vulnerable Neighborhoods 
Randomly Assigned 
Neighborhoods   
Sequentially Assigned 
Neighborhoods 
More 
Vulnerable 
BBP 
Less 
Vulnerable 
BBP   
More 
Vulnerable 
BBP 
Less 
Vulnerable 
BBP 
13 2 
 11 4 10 5 
 10 5   
*The 86 highest demands are all assigned as “more” vulnerable 
Top 40%* of Demand Assigned to "More" Vulnerable 
Neighborhoods 
Randomly Assigned 
Neighborhoods   
Sequentially Assigned 
Neighborhoods 
More 
Vulnerable 
BBP 
Less 
Vulnerable 
BBP   
More 
Vulnerable 
BBP 
Less 
Vulnerable 
BBP 
11 4 
 10 5 12 3 
 11 4   
*The 60 highest demands are all assigned as “more” vulnerable 
Top 20%* of Demand Assigned to "More" Vulnerable 
Neighborhoods 
Randomly Assigned 
Neighborhoods   
Sequentially Assigned 
Neighborhoods 
More 
Vulnerable 
BBP 
Less 
Vulnerable 
BBP   
More 
Vulnerable 
BBP 
Less 
Vulnerable 
BBP 
13 2 
 11 4 14 1 
 14 1   
*The 30 highest demands are all assigned as “more” vulnerable 
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Bottom 40%* of Demand Assigned to "More" 
Vulnerable Neighborhoods 
Randomly Assigned 
Neighborhoods   
Sequentially Assigned 
Neighborhoods 
More 
Vulnerable 
BBP 
Less 
Vulnerable 
BBP   
More 
Vulnerable 
BBP 
Less 
Vulnerable 
BBP 
3 12 
 4 11 3 12 
 1 14   
                           *The 60 lowest demands were assigned as “more” vulnerable 
To have more control as whether the “more” vulnerable demands are covered more 
readily there needs to be some control within in the model to allow BBPs to be sited at “more” 
vulnerable neighborhood as oppose to a “less” vulnerable neighborhood.  Initially, an operating 
cost for each potential BBP was added to the costs for each facility. The model has a parameter 
for the costs, which for the development and analysis of the model was set to the distance 
between potential sites and neighborhoods, and is represented by bij in the second objective of Q1 
(refer to 3.21). The operating costs are defined as: 
  
OCj =     
 
 
And Q1 becomes: 
Q1 = 
k(∑i in I ∑j in J  di cij X1ij)  + 
BBP to Neighborhood system 
(1-k)(∑i in I ∑j in J  di bij ocj X1ij) 
Where ocj is the operating costs of BBP at site j. 
The approach did not offer any better control in the ability to be able to influence what type of 
neighborhood the BBP was sited. 
M, is a large number if “less” vulnerable site 
 
0,  otherwise 
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Another way to approach the problem is as a fixed charge problem. In a fixed charge 
problem a cost, charge, is associated with an aspect of operating a facility. This charge is 
typically associated with “opening” the facility. The goal is to minimize the total amount of fixed 
charges when opening multiple facilities. The fixed charge minimization becomes another 
objective of the model. The objective is defined as: 
Minimize:        ∑j in J  fj Yj 
Where: 
  
 
     f j =     
 
 
     Y j  =     
 
 
 
The model with additional fixed charge objective becomes: 
Minimize:   
      
                   ∑n in N ∑j in J  enj onj X2nj +  
                  k ∑i in I ∑j in J  di cij X1ij +   
                  (1-k) ∑i in I ∑j in J  di bij X1ij + 
∑j in J  fj Yj 
 
 
 
 
 
(3.29) 
M, if   BBP is located at a “less” vulnerable site; 
 
1,  otherwise. 
1, BBP is located at j; 
 
0,  if not. 
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Subject to:   
   
∑j in J  Xij  = 1 for all i (3.30) 
∑j in J Yj = p  (3.31) 
Xij – Yj ≤ 0 for all i and j  (3.32) 
∑n in N X2nj  = Yj for all j (3.33) 
X1ij  = 0,1 for all i  (3.34) 
X2nj = 0,1 for all n and j (3.35) 
Yj = 0,1  for all j (3.36) 
   
   
Where:   
cij = 
 
fj = 
 
X1ij = 
 
X2nj = 
 
Yj =  
 
bij = distance from neighborhood i to BBP j;  
di = demand at neighborhood i; 
enj = distance between BBP at j and POD at n; 
on = operating cost of POD at location n; and 
p =  number of BBPs to locate. 
 
1, if demand of neighborhood i is covered by BBP 
at j; 
 
0, if not;  
1, if BBP is located at site j; 
 
0, if not;   
1, if BBP j   is covered by POD at n; 
 
0, if not;  
1, if distji > coverage distance and neighborhood is 
“more vulnerable; 
 
0, if not;  
M, is a large number if BBP candidate site at j is a 
“less” vulnerable neighborhood; 
 
1, if not;  
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Table 3.20 Comparing Distances between Operating Cost and Fixed Charge 
 
Using Operating Cost parameter 
Average Distance from BBP to Less 
Vulnerable Neighborhoods 
21.4 
Average Distance from BBP to More 
Vulnerable Neighborhoods 
22.8 
Average Distance from BBP to any type 
Neighborhood 
22.2 
Average Distance POD to BBP 20.2 
 
Using Fixed Charge objective 
Average Distance from BBP to Less 
Vulnerable Neighborhoods 
9.8 
Average Distance from BBP to More 
Vulnerable Neighborhoods 
10.7 
Average Distance from BBP to any type 
Neighborhood 
10.3 
Average Distance POD to BBP 18.8 
 
The results of testing the both the operating cost and fixed cost approaches are 
summarized as comparisons in Table 3.20. The distance from the BBPs were lower in the fixed 
cost approach. Figures 3.23 and 3.24 show the spatial relationship of the POD-BBP-
Neighborhood links for each approach. As can be seen both approaches favor the siting of BBPs 
in “more” vulnerable neighborhoods. The operating cost approach allows several BBPs to be 
sited so that they are only serving the neighborhood they are located, and these self-serving sites 
were not apparent in the fixed cost objective. The fixed cost approach offers the ability to 
pinpoint with certainty that the model will only site BBPs in “more” vulnerable neighborhoods. 
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Figure 3.23 Using an operating cost parameter in attempt to influence siting of BBPs (p = 15). 
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Figure 3.24 Using fixed charge objective approach to influence siting of BBPs (p = 15). 
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3.6 Summary 
The resulting model can be summarized as follows: 
 
Q = 
Minimize the 
total distance 
weighted costs 
of POD-BBP 
system 
+ 
Minimize 
uncovered 
“more” 
vulnerable 
demands 
+ 
Minimize total 
demand 
weighted costs 
in BBP-
neighborhood 
system 
+ 
Minimize the 
fixed facility 
costs 
 
The results of the foundational model indicate that the ability to cover the demand for disaster 
relief supplies within a defined set of parameters and emphasize the ability to cover “more” 
vulnerable neighborhoods. As with similar models, this model allows for the delivery of goods 
down to smaller demand points beyond the traditional “points of distribution.” To move the 
formulation of the model further it will be analyzed using data and conditions for an area of the 
State of Connecticut. Additional examination of the proposed model will include a simulation of 
an actual disaster event, and the transformation of transshipment points into origin-destination 
pairs to formulate a hub network. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Study Area and Data 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Place is a simple everyday term that people use throughout their daily lives. Yet, place is 
a complex, fundamental geographical concept encompassing the concepts of location, locale, and 
“sense of place (Cresswell 2015). A place’s location is its physical point on the earth. Along with 
the fixed describing point, the location includes the geophysical and climatic descriptors 
associated with a place’s natural environment or surroundings. The locale is how a place defines 
the space that it occupies. People delineate space by the use of boundaries to identify countries, 
states, counties and cities or towns.  The buildings, roads, and other infrastructure, which the 
people inhabiting a place use to interact or associate with each other within the place, further 
define the space. The sense of place is where history, culture and society come together to define 
how it is to live in a particular place.  
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“Sense of place” is also the result of the interactions between people and their 
environments. In today’s modern world, people’s environments include both the natural and built 
environment, and in people’s daily lives, there may not be a distinction between location and 
locale.  If people’s daily lives can be defined by the interactions between their environment and 
themselves, then a disaster can be seen as a collision between people and their environment. The 
different types of disasters that may occur within a place’s space can further enhance an 
understanding of a place.  
 
4.2 Location 
 
The location for this study is the coastal region of the State of Connecticut. Connecticut is 
located in the northeast portion of the continental United States and is one of six states that make 
up the region called “New England.” Connecticut’s geographical location is shown in Figure 4.1.  
It is within moderate traveling distances to New York City and Boston. The state is fully 
contained within the highly urbanized region of the Eastern United States seacoast known as the 
“Northeast megalopolis” (Gottmann 1964). The “spine” of the region is made up of the roadways 
of U.S. Route 1 and Interstate 95. Gottmann (1964) saw the region as an area of about 600 miles 
long, spanning north from Boston to Washington, D.C. in the south and having a population of 
about 30 million. Today, the region is from southern Maine to Wilmington, North Carolina 
(Schned, n.d.). Figure 4.2 shows the extent of this highly urbanized region along the eastern 
seacoast of the United States.  Connecticut contributes five cities with populations in excess of 
100,000 to the region. 
Connecticut is about 5,543 square miles in total area with 4,842 square miles in land area. 
A factor in this research and the application of the model developed in Chapter Three is the 
length of the coastline. The state has a coastline of about 96 miles (Beaver 2006). However, 
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Figure 4.1 Location of the State of Connecticut in relation to the northeast United States and the 
New England region. 
estimates of this measurement can be as high as 618 miles when a formulation is used to include 
smaller coves and inlets, which is an approach used by NOAA (“General Coastline and 
Shoreline Mileage of the United States” 2016). By comparison with other states, Connecticut is 
48th in land area and 17th in coastline length. 
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Figure 4.2 Gottman’s Megalopolis, adapted from research by The Regional 
Planning Agency (Schned, n.d.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Locale 
Connecticut is divided into 169 cities and towns. The geographical boundaries of the 
counties, cities and towns can be seen in Figure 4.3. Cities and Towns are the primary 
component 
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Figure 4.3 Connecticut Counties and Towns. Connecticut has 8 counties and 169 cities and 
towns   (Source:  U.S. Census Bureau 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of local governance in the state. Towns or Cities may operate under a framework defined by 
State statute or can define their own character by enacting charters. However, in doing so they 
must operate any services they provide to their citizens within the limits and bounds of State 
statutes as such statutes apply to all Cities and Towns. The State’s relationship with Cities and 
Towns was established by the Home Rule Act of 1957 and State constitutional provisions. The 
constitutional provision allows Cities and Towns to operate without fear of the Connecticut 
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General Assembly enacting any type of legislation that could potentially affect a single City or 
Town (League of Women Voters of Connecticut 2010). 
There is no intermediary form of government between the City/Town level and the State 
level. Connecticut’s eight counties are used for statistical and record keeping purposes, and do 
not serve any political purposes. Connecticut abolished the formal county government system in 
1960. Cities and Towns have taken on the governmental functions that were previously carried 
out by the counties (League of Women Voters of Connecticut 2010).  
Though Connecticut no longer has a formal county government system, its Cities and 
Towns have sufficient history and experience in using cooperative programs for various services 
and resources. A commission to study and analyze such programs has been in existence since 
1985 (Russell, West, and Van Ausdall 2000). Cities and Towns can enter into inter-municipal 
agreements to cooperate in all sorts of services such as transportation, health boards, education, 
and planning. Figure 4.4 shows examples of the geographical extent of three types of regional 
agreements: planning, health, and education. In 2000, the state Office of Policy and Management 
(OPM) estimated that there were more than 9,000 agreements between various Cities and Towns 
to share all types of resources and services and in Figure 4.5, the breakdown between educational 
programs and other types of programs is illustrated. Several cities and towns have arrangements 
to share things like public works equipment, computer systems, and communications systems. 
There are various organizations and arrangements for police and fire mutual aid and police/fire  
task forces among different Cities and Towns, but the OPM report found only one “joint 
organization for civil preparedness,” and the organization covered just three towns (Russell, 
West, and Van Ausdall 2000). One drawback to the current system is that the regional 
cooperative arrangements can be temporary and subject to change. For example, because of  
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Figure 4.5 Number of statewide town cooperative programs. In the Connecticut, there are 9457 
programs. The average number a town participates in is 56 with a high of 96 (Windsor) and a 
low of 33 programs (Stafford and Union) (Russell, West, and Van Ausdall, 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
budget constraints the state Office of Policy and Management reduced the number of regional 
planning agencies from ten to five (Note that the Planning Region map, in Figure 4.7,  shows the 
original 10 planning regions prior to the 2013 budget cuts because many of new regions have not 
been finalized). Cities and Towns must have membership in regional agencies authorized by the 
State to advocate for regional planning type activities. Membership in such an agency must align 
with a City’s or Town’s particular focus or planning framework. Many communities had 
concerns about their choices because of the change (Tuz 2013).  
Aligned with the ideals of Home Rule the disaster supply relief system in Connecticut is 
primarily a local City or Town function. This system for distributing disaster relief supplies calls 
for locating Points of Distribution (POD) within each City or Town. The result is a system of 271 
PODs, with each individual City or Town having the ability to locate them as they see fit – 
presumably to meet the needs of that particular community. Figure 4.6 shows the geographical 
distribution of the PODs throughout the state. Each Town is responsible for staffing each site and 
equipping the sites as suggested by the state emergency management officials (State of CT 
Commodities and Resource Support Group 2012). 
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Figure 4.7 Hierarchy of State of Florida Distribution System (FL SERT, 2010) 
Some states, such as Florida, offer counties and local governments exacting 
specifications for the various types of staging areas and PODs. There is also a hierarchy of the 
differing types of distribution areas (see Figure 4.7) that may lead to some efficiencies (“County 
Points of Distribution PowerPoint” 2010). FEMA and US Army Corp of Engineers suggest three 
sizes of PODs. These three sizes are suggested to be able to handle various amounts demand as 
outlined in Table 4.1 (FEMA/USACE 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 POD Types and Volume 
TYPE PERSONS/DAY VEHICLES/HR STAFFING  
(TOTAL INC. DAY & NIGHT) 
I 20,000 560 88 
II 10,000 280 40 
III 5,000 140 23 
                                                                                                   (USACE 2016) 
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Figure 4.8 Diagram of Type III POD specified by Connecticut. (Source: USACE 2016) 
All of Connecticut’s PODs are Type III. The layout and spatial organization of a Type III 
POD is shown in Figure 4.8. For many of the smaller communities this size POD is sufficient to 
handle the expected volume. However, in the larger Cities and Towns, this size POD may not be 
large enough, and those same Cities and Towns may not have enough proposed locations to 
handle the volume. The State does not offer guidance or regulation on the number of PODs that 
should be required by each community.  
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Connecticut’s proposed POD system was analyzed using ArcGIS Business Analyst. The 
reasoning behind this analysis was to determine if the current system of PODs had sufficient 
geographical coverage for the state. Figures 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 are the results of the ArcGIS 
analysis of the POD locations. The analysis determined that there appears to be sufficient 
geographical coverage of the current system. The locations of the PODs were entered in as if 
they were store locations and demand rings were constructed around each location that contained 
a population of 5,000. Even though 5,000 persons is the daily volume capacity, the demand area 
would not be much beyond that population-delineated region.  During an actual event the 
demand may be artificially low because of the lack of access to the located or operational POD, 
for example if the particular event is on one side of a community and traveling to a POD on the 
other side of a community is limited or not possible because of obstructed roads.  Distribution 
guidelines allow for each vehicle to receive a daily allotment of the available supplies, and those 
amounts could be adjusted less if the vehicle cannot carry all the supplies. A pedestrian would 
receive even less supplies.  
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A long-term event would possibly require multiple trips, on a daily basis, to the POD for 
relief supplies for each affected household. An example of the scale of supplies that could be 
required is Figure 4.12. The figure shows the path of Hurricane Wilma and the affected area in 
Florida, and the amount of relief supplies distributed. Hurricane Wilma was the last Category 3 
hurricane to make landfall along the U.S. east coast in over ten years. Accordingly, FEMA 
suggests that supply a Type III POD would require deliveries from at least three separate trucks: 
one truck for water, one truck for ice and one truck for food and tarps (requirements of tarps and 
food can be met with a half truck respectively). Under the current system, even if only a handful 
PODs are opened, a large fleet of trucks would be required to move supplies from a large-scale 
staging area located in East Hartford. 
When developing the model in Chapter Three, one of the beliefs was there may be some 
inefficiencies in Connecticut’s current disaster relief supply system. The model was designed to 
cover a larger area than a single town. Since, Connecticut has no county or intermediary 
government between the local and State levels for the purposes of testing the model a large 
region is needed. As established, Connecticut does have a hodgepodge of cooperative 
arrangement among some towns; therefore, such a cooperative region for use during a disaster 
event would not be out of the norm for the Cities and Towns in the State. The development of a 
region can be quite complex, requiring the examination of similarities, dissimilarities, and 
methods or measure of connections between places, but this not the focus of this research. A 
simpler approach was utilized by using a common geophysical characteristic to develop a region. 
Connecticut has a coastline of about 100 miles long, and the coast was chosen as the foundation 
for the testing region 
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To test the model a region compromising the towns along Connecticut’s shoreline will be 
utilized. The region will be made up of 25 towns along the shore from the New York state line to 
the Rhode Island state line. The region has a population of 1,084,541. Table 4.2 illustrates how 
the region compares with existing county geographical areas. The region, like the “megalopolis” 
shares a framework the major roadways of Interstate 95 and US Highway 1. The region will use 
the existing PODs system, as they are located within the region. However, the model will 
anticipate that the PODs will need to service areas outside of the town in which the PODs are 
located. Figure 4.14 shows the proposed Coastal Cooperative Region (CCR). 
 
Table 4.2 Comparing Sizing of Model Region with existing CT Counties 
Region Number of 
Towns 
Population 
(2010 US 
Census) 
Land Area 
(sq. mi.) 
Density (uniform 
persons/sq.mi.) 
Connecticut 169 3,574,097 4845.4 737.6 
Fairfield Cnty 23 916,829 625.9 1464.8 
Hartford Cnty 29 894,014 735.5 1215.5 
Litchfield Cnty 26 189,927 920.0 206.4 
Middlesex Cnty 15 165,676 369.3 448.6 
New Haven Cnty 27 862,477 605.8 1423.7 
New London Cnty 21 274,055 666.1 411.4 
Tolland Cnty 13 152,691 410.1 372.3 
Windham Cnty 15 118,428 512.8 230.9 
Ave. County 21 446,762 605.7 721.7 
Model Region 25 1,084,541 604.5 1794.1 
                                                                                                 (U.S. Census Bureau 2010) 
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4.4 Sense of Place 
In Cresswell’s outline of Agnew’s description of place the “sense of place” is defined as 
the intangible understanding of the makeup or composition of a location. This composition is a 
combination of the place’s location and locale. To get a “sense of a place” one has to understand 
the foundational elements of a location as perceived by the people who interact with that 
location. These elements take the form of history, culture and traditions. In understanding the 
“sense of place”, concerning disasters, there are two major blocks of understanding that have to 
be examined. The first is a historical and predictive understanding of what types of disasters have 
occurred and what types might occur. Hewitt and Burton believed that any location could 
experience many different types of natural hazards and subsequent disasters (Hewitt and Burton 
1971). What has happened in the past may help inform as to what could happen in the future. 
The second element of a place is the locations socioeconomic composition. This element helps 
planners determine what type of aid or resources could be required by a place in the event of a 
disaster. 
Understanding the types of disasters that can occur and what types of hazards that may 
have an impact on a population can be key to understanding how to plan for such events. During 
Connecticut’s over 400 hundred year history the State has experienced almost every type of 
hazard. Table 4.3 lists some examples of such events. Additionally, Figure 4.16 shows the types  
of extreme weather events, as cataloged by NOAA, from 1955 until 2014 (NOAA 2015). 
Connecticut has also had 31 federal disaster declarations in the same period as seen in Figure 
4.15 (“Disaster Declarations by Year” 2013). 
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Figure 4.14 Number of federal disaster declarations for the State of Connecticut 1954 to 2014 
(“Disaster Declarations by Year, 2015) 
Table 4.3 Examples of Connecticut Disasters 
                                                                                                                     (CT State Library 2015) 
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Over the period, 1955 to 2014, wind events have been the most prevalent weather event, 
more specifically thunderstorm wind events. Thunderstorm wind events accounted for 1497 of 
the recorded extreme weather events. This amount of those type of events is nearly three times 
the next closest weather event, hail. A similar trend can be seen for deaths, injuries and damage 
where wind type events account for the highest in those categories. As Hewitt and Burton 
pointed out over 45 years ago a location has to be prepared for a multitude of hazards and 
disaster types (Hewitt and Burton 1971). Hewitt pointed out the complexity in attempting to 
determine the probability of such events (Hewitt 1970). Therefore, planners need to have an 
understanding that “if it has happened before…it can happen again.” Planners need to have plans 
and systems in place to adapt and be flexible to varying hazards and events.  
Several researchers (Baker 1991; Cutter 2005; Fothergill, Maestas, and Darlington 
1999; Morrow 1999) suggest that an understanding of the population and socioeconomic 
composition of that population is important to disaster research and preparedness of an 
area. This understanding offers insights as to the type and amount of assistance that a 
location may require after a disaster. As a whole the State of Connecticut, when compared 
to other states, is ranked highly with regards to personal economic indicators. Table 4.4 
summarizes some of these indicators for the State.  The State is highly ranked in both 
median household income and per capita personal income. Similarly, the State ranks high 
with regards to average annual income, and home values of the State are higher than the 
United States as a whole by a factor of over 150%. Connecticut performs above the United 
States average in terms of educational attainment pertaining to high school graduation and 
the percent of the population with a bachelor’s degree.  
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Table 4.4 Selected Data Rankings for Connecticut 
Category Value Rank Year Notes 
Average Annual Pay $58,029 2nd 2007  
Personal Income per 
capita 
$56,272 1st 2008 
 
Median Household 
Income 
$68,595 3rd 2008 
 
Persons Below Poverty 9.3% 45th 2008 
US percentage 14.8% 
Median Home Value $274,500  2010-2014 
US median value 
$175,500 
Persons who are High 
School graduate or 
Higher 
89.5%  2010-2014 
US percentage 86.3% 
Persons with Bachelor's 
Degree or Higher 
35.6% 2nd 2008 
 
                                                                                             (U.S. Census Bureau 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114 
 
F
ig
u
re
 4
.1
6
 C
o
as
ta
l 
C
o
u
n
ti
es
 i
n
 C
o
n
n
ec
ti
cu
t 
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 b
y
 t
h
e 
U
.S
. 
C
en
su
s 
B
u
re
au
  
 (
S
o
u
rc
e:
  
U
.S
. 
C
en
su
s 
B
u
re
au
 2
0
1
0
) 
 
 
  
 
 
115 
 
Figure 4.17 Percentage of population in coastal and inland counties in Connecticut  (Source:  
U.S. Census Bureau 2010)  
 
The State’s coastal counties follow similar population growth as those seen in 
coastal counties in the United States. Figure 4.17 highlights the counties in Connecticut that 
the U.S. Census Bureau classifies as “coastal counties.” In 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau 
found that less than 10% of the United States’ 3,142 counties were on a saltwater coast, 
and those counties accounted for 29% of the United States’ population(Wilson and 
Fischetti 2010). In Connecticut the four coastal counties, Fairfield, Middlesex, New Haven, 
and New London, account for about 62% of the State’s 2012 population, and those counties 
contain 7 out of 10 of the most populous cities and towns in the State. In Figure 4.18, the 
percentage of population of inland and coastal counties in the State is shown over time.  
The population density of the coastal counties in Connecticut has also increased over the 
same time period, and this trend can be seen in Figure 4.19.  
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Figure 4.18 Population Density of coastal and inland counties in Connecticut   (Source:  U.S. 
Census Bureau 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two economic factors that were key in the motivation in developing the proposed model 
are: (1) percentage of households that receive public assistance and (2) percentage of households 
that do not have access to a vehicle. Public assistance is seen as an indicator as to whether or not 
a household would require disaster assistance or have a tendency not to evacuate (Baker 1991; 
Fothergill and Peek 2004). Horner and Downs, in one of their models, used public assistance 
measurements as a way to define and quantify demand for relief supplies (Horner and Downs 
2010). The access to a vehicle is central to the current distribution system. The current system is 
designed around the ability of people to drive to a location and drive through the POD. As they 
drive through the POD, their vehicle is loaded with various available supplies (food, water, and 
tarps) at load points. For people without vehicles the current system is not effective. The 
distribution of households without vehicles and households on public assistance is seen in 
Figures 4.20 and 4.21. 
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As discussed in Chapter Two there a several actual and proposed methods to determine 
and develop vulnerability indices to hazards. Cutter and Heinz Center succinctly compiled a list 
of such factors, a sample of these factors is shown in Table 4.5 (Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 2003; 
“Human Links to Coastal Disasters” 2002). From this list of indicators and other similar ones 
Cutter, et. al. developed the Social Vulnerability Index (SOVI®) (Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 
2003). The goal of this research is not to “create” a new index or approach, but to integrate such 
information into a model for the distribution of relief supplies and aid. For modeling purposes 
the Social Vulnerability Index (SOVI®) maintained by the Hazards and Vulnerability Research 
Institute at the University of South Carolina will be utilized. This index is the same one proposed 
and develop by Cutter, et. al. The index utilizes 27 to 29 variables to determine the level of social 
vulnerability for a geographic area. A summary of the variables used for Connecticut’s SOVI® is 
in Table 4.6. The index is developed using factor analysis to reduce the number of variables that 
explain a large portion of the variance. The resulting variables are then placed into an additive 
model using Z scores to compute a summary score (Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute 
2014). The index will be used at the census tract level for the state of Connecticut. To measure a 
particular geographical area’s index value the area is ranked by 5-quantiles or quintiles within a 
larger area. Figure 4.22 shows how a particular areas vulnerability changes relative to its 
grouping. These differences for Connecticut and this research’s CCR is shown in Figure 4.23 and 
Table 4.7. Figure 4.24 shows the ranking system that will be utilized within the proposed model.  
There is a drawback to the use of the SOVI®, and the drawback is that it offers a 
snapshot in time of an areas social vulnerability. However, many of the factors remain 
consistent, over time changes in data gathering and availability occurs. These changes make it 
difficult to compare the index over time periods. A strong argument has been presented for the 
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statistical integrity of the index over varying area sizes (Schmidtlein et al. 2008), but changes in 
available data at the time the index is formulated may cause problems with it translating over 
time periods. Similar problems occur with changes of area delineation, data available at the state 
or county level is not necessarily available at the tract or block levels. 
 
Table 4.5 Some Vulnerability Factors 
Characteristic Description Influence on Vulnerability 
Socioeconomic Status This gives indication of how 
a place can absorb losses. 
Encompass things like a 
places wealth, political power 
and safety net infrastructure 
High wealth and/or power (+) 
Low wealth  (-) 
Age Age composition of a place 
may affect the movement out 
of harm’s way. 
Elderly (+) 
Children (+) 
Commercial and Industrial 
Development 
The value and density of 
these give insight into the 
economic health of a place 
High density (+) 
High value (+/-) 
Infrastructure and lifelines Weakened or aged sewer 
systems, water systems, 
bridges, highways and 
communications have a ripple 
effect through a disaster 
Infrastructure (+) 
Housing stock The type, value and density of 
housing available in a place  
Mobile homes (+) 
Rural/Urban Rural areas may be poorer 
with fewer resources. Urban 
areas may have higher 
densities making evacuation 
difficult 
Rural (+) 
Urban (+) 
This is not an exhaustive list of all the factors that might go into formulating a vulnerability 
index to hazards. This a representative list as compile from a longer list developed by the Heinz 
Center. (“Human Links to Coastal Disasters” 2002) 
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Table 4.6 Components of SOVI® 
 
Tract level 2006-10 Social Vulnerability Component Summary for the State of Connecticut. The 
dominate variables are listed within each component in the order of each variables dominance. 
The cardinality indicates whether that component adds to or subtracts from the tracts 
vulnerability (Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute 2014). 
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Figure 4.22 Comparison of how SOVI ranking can differ with regards to the larger overall group 
it is compared within (Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute 2014) 
 (citation hvri website)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7 Comparison of different SOVI® Rankings 
The universe in which the SOVI® is ranked effects the quantities ranked in each rank. 
Ranking Number of rank  
(ranked among all state tracts) 
Number of rank  
(ranked among all coastal tracts) 
High 21 24 
Medium High 55 61 
Medium 115 89 
Medium Low 53 63 
Low 15 24 
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4.5 Summary  
In examining the state of Connecticut, it was found that the proposed model could be 
beneficial to the state in the event of a disaster. Connecticut has a history of all types of disasters. 
The state is located in a highly urbanized densely populated area of the United States. The state 
contains counties that have continued population growth and increases in density. Connecticut by 
some measures is consider a “rich” state. However, examination of some economic factors points 
to some extremely poor areas within the state. There are sixty-six census tracts that have well 
over 40% of households receiving public assistance, with some of those tracts located in one of 
the richest counties in the country.  Similarly, in forty-seven tracts over 36% of the households 
do not have a vehicle. This factor is important because the current distribution system depends 
on people who require supplies to have access to a vehicle. 
Though it is complex to develop a measure of a population’s vulnerability to a disaster 
there have been attempts. The SOVI® is one of the more comprehensive attempts. The index can 
be used at varying geographical scales. However, it cannot be compared across differing 
geographies because the components of the index may change. This is because differing levels of 
data are available at differing geographies. The index is also a snapshot in time, and it cannot be 
compared over periods. The reason is the same as for differing geographies – the components 
may be slightly different over different periods. The index does offer an ability to test the 
concept of the proposed model. The index provides a compact way to enter vulnerability levels 
into the model. 
Moving forward the information in this chapter will be utilized in Chapter Five. In 
Chapter Five, the proposed model will be tested using the SOVI® for Connecticut at the census 
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tract level, and actual population demands. The proposed model will use as its foundation the 
proposed CCR, from this chapter, and the located PODs. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Model Testing and Analysis 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this, chapter theoretical and reality are merged. The proposed model, developed in 
Chapter Three, will be used to build a disaster relief supply chain for a region in the State of 
Connecticut. Data that was presented in Chapter Four will be used within the framework of the 
proposed model. The proposed model to locate distribution facilities will utilize actual census 
and road network data, for the proposed Coastal Cooperative Region (CCR). Once the model is 
tested for an event affecting the entire region, the model will be further tested using a simulated 
disaster event, and the resulting locations of transshipment points are used as a foundation for a 
hub network. 
The discussion in the chapter outlines the four aspects of how the proposed model is 
tested. The chapter has a brief overview of how ArcGIS is used to develop a road network using 
publicly available data sources. The chapter furthers the discussion about the adequacy of the 
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Objective 1 
POD – BBP Link  
Objective 4  
current POD system that was introduced in Chapter Four. Throughout the chapter, the general 
performance of the proposed model is examined under changing parameters.  
5.2 Overview of Model Testing 
The disaster relief logistic model developed in Section 3.4 (Equations 3.29 – 3.36) in 
Chapter Three had a multi-criteria objection function which balanced the following competing 
goals against one another: 1) minimize the total distance—weighted costs of the POD—BBP 
system; 2) minimize the number of uncovered “more” vulnerable demand sites; 3) minimize the 
total demand – weighted costs in the BBP—neighborhood system and 4) minimize the total fixed 
facility costs of the BBPs. The relationships of the objectives is outlined in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
 
 
Q= 
Minimize the 
total distance 
weighted costs 
of POD-BBP 
system 
+ 
Minimize 
uncovered 
“more” 
vulnerable 
demands 
+ 
Minimize total 
demand 
weighted costs 
in BBP-
neighborhood 
system 
+ 
Minimize the 
fixed facility 
costs of BBPs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Objective 2, 3 and 4 
BBP—neighborhood links  
Figure 5.1 Relationships of objectives in proposed model 
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During the testing process of the proposed model, using “real” or “live” data the entire 
model was tested, but during the different phases the performance of particular objectives was 
the focus of the analysis. In the initial phases of testing, it was assumed that the entire CCR was 
affected by a disaster event. The performance of the first objective, the POD – BBP link, was the 
focus of the first phase of testing. In this testing phase, a large pool of available POD locations 
could be made smaller. The next phase of testing objectives two, three and four were the focus of 
the testing. In this phase the BBP – neighborhood links were examined under varying 
parameters. The range of number of BBPs to locate or p value was varied from 5 to 85. As with 
the POD – BBP link analysis the model was tested with all available POD locations and then 
with smaller sets of POD locations. In addition to varying the p value, a cost factor multiplier 
was tested on the BBP – neighborhood link. The third phase of testing took values for p and the 
set of POD locations, found in phases one and two, and used those parameters to be tested in a 
simulated disaster event. Using publicly available software, from FEMA, the historic 1938 
hurricane was recreated. In this phase, a smaller set of affected census tracts in the CCR was 
tested. The final phase of testing entailed taking the results from the simulated event and 
transforming those locations into a hub network. 
The final goal of the phases one through three was to build a distribution network, as 
shown in Figure 5.2. In the figure, the LSA is outside of the proposed model. The network 
assumes that goods move from the LSA to PODs efficiently, and within the model, the goods 
travel from the PODs to the BBPs, then onto neighborhoods. Neighborhoods are the demand 
points, and BBPs are chosen from the set of neighborhoods. The POD locations are known. 
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Figure 5.2 Diagram shows the Logistic Staging Area (LSA) to PODs to BBPs to Neighborhoods 
system. The parts contained within the gray dashed box are those considered by the proposed 
model. 
 
5.3 Developing the Network 
To test the proposed model a network was developed using ArcGIS Network Analyst. At 
the foundation of the network was a road network from OpenStreets obtained from ArcGIS 
Online Services (as seen in Figure 5.3). . This street network was publicly available, and the 
network contained the minimum requirements for a street network that could be used by ArcGIS 
Network Analyst Toolbox. ArcGIS transformed the street network into a network dataset. This 
transformation turns the street map into a system of nodes and junctions from which the ArcGIS 
Network Analyst Toolbox can use to perform calculations. Figure 5.4 shows the nodes, edges 
and junctions produce to complete the network dataset. 
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Figure 5.4 Various components of the Network dataset created by ArcGIS for use in the 
Network Analysis Toolbox 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Points of Distribution System 
To integrate the proposed system for disaster relief supplies into the current system the 
use of the current Points of Distribution System (PODs), utilized by the state of Connecticut, was 
decided as the starting point of the model. Recalling from Figure 5.2 the proposed model 
attempts to take goods from the Logistical Staging Area (LSA), operated to by the state, to the 
PODs and down the Bulk Breakout Points (BBP) and finally to the neighborhoods. The proposed 
model moves the goods from the PODs to BBPs and on to the neighborhoods. The leg from the 
LSA to the POD is left for future analysis. 
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As discussed in Chapter Four the current system encompasses 271 locations, with fifty-
five of those locations are located within the CCR. Figure 5.5 shows the location of all the PODs 
statewide, and Figure 5.6 highlights the ones located in the proposed CCR. Each of these 
locations is considered a FEMA Class III POD. A Class III POD is defined as having a capacity 
of 5,000 person/day or about 1660 households (FEMA/USACE 2008). However, for this model 
the capacity of the PODs is not under consideration. The PODs, under the proposed model, will 
transform into transshipment points as oppose to “drive-thru” pick up locations. It is anticipated 
that the PODs will still function at some level as pick up locations – but that is not factored into 
the proposed model. The candidate POD sites were located on the network using actual street 
addresses obtained from the State of Connecticut and those addresses were geocoded by ArcGIS. 
Table 5.1 offers a sample of the format the locations’ addresses. 
 
Table 5.1 Sample of POD addresses used for geocoding 
Name Street City Zip 
Walmart Lot 120 Commercial 
Parkway  
Branford 06405 
Food World 
Parking Lot 
345 Huntington 
Turnpike 
Bridgeport 06610 
Shaw's 
Supermarket 
Parking Lot 
500 Sylvan 
Avenue  
Bridgeport 06606 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
Bedford Middle 
School 
88 North Avenue Westport 06880 
Kings Highway 
Elementary 
School 
125 Post Road W Westport 06880 
                                          (State of CT Commodities and Resource Support Group, 2102) 
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Trade Area analysis of the current POD system was examined in Chapter Four. Using 
ArcGIS Business Analyst 2014 descriptive trade areas for each location was established. A 
descriptive trade area is one in which the customers are described in spatial and aspatial ways. 
What the Business Analyst did when given the spatial distribution of the potential stores (PODs) 
was that it used internal data sources regarding population and households to estimate a trade 
area for each POD. This analysis was carried out in two ways, and examined visually for any 
patterns. The first analysis was conducted using number of households as the threshold. As 
would be expected the PODs located in more densely populated urban areas had smaller trade 
areas then more rural less populated areas. The second analysis was performed using driving 
distance. This analysis revealed much more geographical coverage than the household threshold 
– however, there may also be much more overlap among trade areas, which could indicate 
inefficiencies in the siting of the PODs. Figures 4.9 and 4.10 further this discussion. 
The purpose of the analysis was to see if in fact the current POD system had adequate 
coverage. Visually, as the discussion in Chapter Four reinforces, it does appear that the current 
system does have adequate geographical coverage. However, the current system is an automobile 
centric “drive thru” distribution plan. This adequate coverage does confirm that the current POD 
system forms can form a foundation for the proposed model. 
Since, the proposed model uses the current PODs primarily as a transshipment point from 
the LSA to the BBP it was determined that the number of PODs the model could choose from 
could be less than the current number of available locations. The proposed model was run using 
all fifty-five available POD locations within the CCR. The number of PODs utilized by the 
model reached a maximum of thirty-nine. Figure 5.7 summarizes the relationship among Number 
of BBPs; Number of PODs sited and distances and  Figure 5.8 shows the model run with p=80 
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Figure 5.7 Graph shows the relationship between number of BBPs, PODs and distances. Blue 
“candlesticks” show the distance range from POD to BBP for each BBP or p  
and availability of all PODs. This result offered insight that the model could function with less 
than the fifty-five PODs available. Further evidence of this type of reasoning was found in a 
restriction used by a similar model by Horner and Downs (Horner and Downs 2007). Their 
restriction on the POD universe was as follows: 
 
PODs < defined number of BBPs < Neighborhoods 
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During the model development, for this research, the lack of such a restriction did not 
appear to cause any difficulties in the proposed model’s performance. The Horner and Downs 
restriction does offer guidance that a smaller set of PODs could be used within the proposed 
model. In the same model, Horner and Downs placed a restriction of the number of intermediary 
distribution points each POD will service. They define it as a “user defined number locations” 
that is served by each respective POD location. For this research’s model, this type of restriction 
does not seem appropriate, because as Horner and Downs illustrate in their model, such a 
restriction will cause unanticipated distances between PODs and the intermediary or BBP 
locations. In other words, the model will “force” a POD site to service a BBP to meet the service 
restriction, and will affect the efficiency or true optimization of the system. Table 5.2 shows the 
average distance from POD to potential BBP locations for various sets of POD locations. These 
average distances were determined from the Origin-Destination Matrix generated by ArcGIS 
Network Analyst using candidate POD sites as Origins and candidate BBP sites as Destinations.  
. 
 
Table 5.2 Average Distance to BBP for various POD sets 
POD Location Candidate Sets 
Average Distance to candidate BBP 
Site 
(Miles) 
All available candidate POD sites 
34.23 
PODs located at 18 more vulnerable candidate sites 
31.69 
PODs located at 9 more vulnerable candidate sites 
27.37 
PODs located at 4 more vulnerable candidate sites 
30.94 
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The universe of PODs was further shrunk by randomly selecting eighteen, nine, and four 
POD locations from all the available locations in the CCR (as seen in Figure 5.9). At this time in 
the application of the model, some “soft” operational parameters were needed to be established. 
These parameters would put the model’s efficiency within context. The first such parameter was 
that BBP could be serviced by a POD within a mean distance between 5 and 15 miles on the 
network. Figure 5.10 and Table 5.3 summarizes the results of the various testing of the different 
POD location sets.  
When examining the socioeconomic indicators of the CCR a particular pattern was 
observed. This pattern was apparent in the examination of More Vulnerable neighborhoods in 
relation to other More Vulnerable neighborhoods. Both cluster and hot spot analysis show that 
the areas of concentration of More Vulnerable neighborhoods is in the western part of the CCR. 
With this pattern in mind three additional sets of POD locations were developed. In each of these 
sets, the PODs located in the tracts with the highest vulnerability scores were used as locations 
for the model to choose. The sets were comprised of eighteen, nine, and four locations; Figure 
5.11 shows the locations for each respective set. Since these sets were chosen for a specific 
characteristic, being located within a more vulnerable neighborhood, the spatial distribution of 
each set of POD locations was examined to determine if the set was similar in distribution as to 
the original set of fifty-five. The spatial distribution of set of PODs located within neighborhoods 
that are more vulnerable is shown in Figure 5.12. The spatial distribution for the sets containing 
eighteen and nine available PODs was similar to the set of fifty-five. The set containing four 
PODs had distribution too narrow and orientated too far west. Figure 5.13 is the locations of the 
candidate POD sites that will be used in further testing of the proposed model. This is the set of 
eighteen candidate sites located in tracts that are more vulnerable.  
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Table 5.3 Range of POD-BBP distance and number POD sited 
Available PODs 
(to be sited) 
Range of Mean Distance 
(Miles) 
Range of PODs sited 
All 1.458 - 2.035 5 - 39 
18 More Vulnerable 4.833 -6.795 5 - 18 
9 More Vulnerable 9.804 - 14.385 4 - 9 
4 More Vulnerable 12.485 - 16.929 4 
18 Random 3.993 - 6.190 5 - 16 
9 Random 6.069 - 8.716 4 - 9 
4 Random 14.976 - 20.837 3 - 4 
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Figure 5.10 Testing of Various POD sets 
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During the research of the current POD system a casual examination of the current 
locations was done, and what was found was that some of locations may not be suitable to be 
POD sites or up to FEMA standards. Though site suitability is not the focus of this research it 
must be understood, that under the proposed model, site requirements may have to be more 
strictly followed. The proposed system does believe that the POD locations could fulfill both 
missions of being a traditional drive through POD and a transshipment point. These goals can 
only be achieved if the site locations are sized properly and have the appropriate amenities to 
allow both operations. For now, mathematical examination of this ability will be left for future 
research, but does offer additional in sight as to why a smaller set of POD locations can be 
utilized.  
5.5 Building the Bulk-Breakout-Points to Neighborhood network 
Once the universe of PODs was examined, the system of neighborhoods was developed. 
Since, there was no standard geography for a neighborhood within the cities and towns of the 
CCR the geographical unit of the census tract was chosen to represent a neighborhood. The 
census tract boundaries that were used were obtained from the 2010 U.S. Census, and the 
shapefiles used in ArcGIS were from the U.S. Census Bureau. These files were obtained through 
the NHGIS system (Minnesota Population Center 2011). The census tracts for Connecticut are 
shown in Figure 5.14. For the proposed model, the demand was aggregated at the centroid of 
each census tract. The centroid locations were calculated within ArcGIS 10.3 for each tract. 
ArcGIS, using the Network Analyst Toolbox to the street network dataset, then attached the 
centroid. Figure 5.15 shows the centroid locations with their demand. The attachment parameters 
were set such that every centroid was attached to the network. At this point one census tract, in 
the area of the Town of East Lyme, was dropped from the modeling universe. This particular 
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census tract appears to be associated with a state prison, and did not have any demand or SOVI 
data associated. The Network Analyst Toolbox calculated an Origin-Destination Distance Matrix 
using those locations. This matrix was calculated in a similar manner as the one created for the 
PODs to tract centroids 
Even though the previous discussion of the proposed model determined that a set of 
eighteen candidate POD sites located in tracts that are, more vulnerable would be a sufficient set 
of candidate sites for the model, the next analysis of the proposed model will take a step back. In 
the following, the examination the proposed model will be used with the entire set of fifty-five 
candidate POD sites. In a later model developed by Horner and Downs (Horner and Downs 
2010) they suggested that the distance from BBP to Neighborhood by multiplied by some large 
number. This cost factor, in their rational, was a way to make the BBP to Neighborhood link in 
the model more prominent. They suggested a value of about 200. They theorized that the BBP to 
Neighborhood link would create about 200 more trips than the POD to BBP link in their model. 
Following their logic, the proposed model was tested using a cost factor of 240, and Figure 5.16 
shows that the proposed model behaves similarly regardless of the addition of a cost factor. 
Figure 5.17 shows that the cost factor has little influence on the distances between 
neighborhoods and BBPs as sited by the proposed model. This is done by examining the slope 
and general trend of the average distances of more vulnerable neighborhoods to BBP, less 
vulnerable neighborhoods to BBP and all neighborhoods to BBP 
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Figure 5.16 Graphs show the behavior of the model’s objective (red dashed line), average 
distance from BBP to more vulnerable neighborhoods (green solid) and first derivative of the 
average distance BBP to neighborhood line measures rate of change of the average distance. 
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Figure 5.17 Graphs show the behavior of the average distance of the BBP to neighborhood link 
of the model 
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After the examination presented in Figures 5.16 and 5.17 there does not appear that the 
proposed model requires any adjustments to what was developed and proposed in Chapter Three. 
Thus, an examination of the model’s performance, concerning, the BBP-Neighborhood linkage 
will continue. Remembering that one of the goals is to maximize coverage of more vulnerable 
neighborhoods, it was determined, that one of the ways to obtain that goal was to site BBPs in 
more vulnerable neighborhoods. So, in examining an extreme, where the model sites eighty-five 
BBPs (or p = 85 and the CCR contains eighty-six neighborhoods as defined as more vulnerable) 
would seem an ideal solution. However, at p = 85 the model sites numerous “orphan” BBPs. 
Orphan BBPs are BBP sites that only service the neighborhood they are sited in – they do not 
have any network connection to any other neighborhoods. This is not necessarily a fatal fault 
because part of the proposed model has a coverage aspect. Figure 5.18 is the entire solution of 
the model for p = 85 and all fifty-five POD candidate sites, and Figure 5.19 is the set of sited 
BBPs. Table 5.4 summarizes the number “orphan” BBPs for the various p values. 
Table 5.4 Number of “Orphan” BBPs 
 
 
p Value
Number of 
Orphan 
BBPs Sited
5 -- 40 0
45 2
50 4
55 6
60 8
65 11
70 13
75 13
80 18
85 28
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Figure 5.20 Solution for 18 candidate POD sites. p= number of BBPs sited by the model 
5.6 Examination of a complete solution 
The step-wise analysis of the proposed model has led to some general conclusions about 
the performance of the model. The first being the most intuitive is that as more BBPs are added, 
or as p increases, the average distance along the BBP-Neighborhood links decreases. However, it 
was also found that as p increases beyond 40 the model begins to site “orphan” BBPs. Though 
this does necessarily point to a fault in the model, it may lead to inefficiencies if resources are 
scare to staff and equip such locations. Analysis of the POD candidate sites indicated that the 
model could function without having to use all available candidates, and in fact, the model did 
not utilize more than thirty-nine candidate sites. The candidate POD sites were set at eighteen 
located in the more vulnerable tracts (as seen in Figure 5.13).  
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In Figure 5.20 is a graph that summarizes the model when the eighteen POD sites are 
utilized. The objective behaves similar to the objective seen in Figure 5.16., and the BBP-
Neighborhood link behaves similarly. The BBP-Neighborhood link behavior stayed consistent 
throughout all the model testing. The model gave very similar results for changes in the 
parameters of the model for that link. There were slight variations when the cost factor multiplier 
was introduced into the model, but for the most part the link was consistent. The BBP-
neighborhood distance is less for neighborhoods that are more vulnerable compared to those that 
are less vulnerable. The first derivative of the average distance BBP-Neighborhood line is shown 
in Figure 5.20. This shows that the biggest rate of change in the average distance is between p = 
5 and 10, and then the rate of change remains constant to p=85. Examination of the objective4 
line on the graph shows that the objective, or costs, begin to rise after about p = 60. This rise in 
costs is attributed to the fixed cost objective in the model. Ideally, as the model sites more BBPs 
the model should become more efficient or the costs continue to decrease, however the presence 
of the fixed cost objective continues to add costs to the model. The average distance BBP to 
neighborhood line is “lumpy” because of the way the average was calculated. Neighborhoods 
that had BBPs located in them were considered to have a distance of zero, and those 
neighborhoods were not included in the set of neighborhoods for averaging purposes. Table 5.5 
shows the results of the model for values of p. Figure 5.21 shows the solution to the model for p 
= 30, and Figure 5.22 summarizes the distances for the solution. 
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Figure 5.23 Summary of the demand filled by each POD location. The percentage of demand 
ranges for 18% of the demand to 1%. 
  
Figure 5.22 Box plots of distances for p=30 and 18 set POD solution. 
Once the model solution can be visualized, the next question that needs to be examined is 
what are the demands placed on each individual site. This analysis is particularly important, 
about disaster relief, because planners need to have an idea how the system may react because of 
secondary event. . Since, the model is uncapacitated there are no upper bounds of each sited 
POD or BBP. Traditionally, a chart such as a pie chart, as seen in Figure 5.23, can be used for 
this analysis. However, the tree maps, seen in Figure 5.24, are more informative. The tree maps 
display the relative relationship among PODs, BBPs and Neighborhoods. 
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Figure 5.24 Tree maps of number of neighborhoods and demand served by each POD. Heavier 
lines signify POD, lighter dark lines are BBPs and gray lines are neighbor 
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Figure 5.25 Historical forecast of 1938 Hurricane from the National Weather Service (“U.S. 
Daily Weather Maps| NOAA Central Library” 2016) 
5.7 Simulation Test of the Model 
Taking the analysis of the proposed, an additional step the model was tested using the 
results of a simulated disaster. Using a software program developed by FEMA called “HAZUS-
MH” the proposed CCR was used as the geographical region of study for a potential disaster. 
The disaster chosen was the historical 1938 Hurricane. The 1938 Hurricane was one of the most 
devastating storms to strike the New England region. The storm made landfall on Sept. 21, 1938, 
and Figure 5.25 shows the historical forecast from that day.(“U.S. Daily Weather Maps | NOAA 
Central Library” 2016), and Table 5.6 summarizes some the key facts about the storm (US 
Department of Commerce 2016) 
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Table 5.6 1938 Hurricane Quick Facts 
 Category 3 Hurricane when made landfall at Connecticut on Sept. 21, 1938 
 564 deaths and 1,700 injuries related to the storm along its path through New England 
 8900 buildings destroyed and >15,000 damaged 
 Catastrophic fires in New London and Mystic area because of downed power lines 
                                                                                   (US Department of Commerce 2016) 
The historical path of the storm is shown in Figure 5.26. HAZUS used that path and 
internal data describing building stock and population to determine the expected extent of 
damage from such a storm. Table 5.7 offers a snapshot of the region as described by HAZUS. In 
the simulation, HAZUS determined that at least 71,500 buildings in the CCR will have at least 
minor damage, and there will be about 1130 homes destroyed. The simulation estimates that 
2,434 households will be displaced and 508 of those households will seek temporary shelter. 
Table 5.8 shows the potential economic losses determined by the simulation. 
 
Table 5.7 CCR Snapshot by HAZUS 
Geographical Size 616 sq. miles 
Census Tracts 259 (258 will actually be used to test model) 
Total Households 413,000 
Total Population 1,082,448 
Total Buildings 347,000 
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Figure 5.26 Path of 1938 Hurricane. The left is the overall path of the storm and the right shows 
the storm just before landfall. These maps were created using HAZUS-MH and Hurrevac 
Table 5.8 Potential Economic Losses (Thousands of Dollars) 
 
 
After the simulation was completed the program generates shapefiles for the various 
solved and simulated parameters, and to test the model the parameters for the following were 
examined: the probability of at least minor damage to a residential building; short term sheltering 
requirements; displaced households; and tree debris. From those shapefiles a Damage Scorecard 
was developed. Each census tract in the CCR was ranked 0 or 1 for each of the parameters, and 
those rankings can be seen in Figure 5.27. The rankings were added across the four parameters 
Category Area Residential Commercial Industrial Others Total
Building 2,418,161.51 255,986.81 63,579.53 66,134.50 2,803,862.35
Content 705,563.05 99,827.99 44,020.54 29,895.93 879,307.51
Inventory 0.00 1,610.40 5,561.58 248.04 7,420.02
Subtotal 3,123,724.56 357,425.20 113,161.65 96,278.47 3,690,589.88
Income 178.14 25,132.57 650.23 5,433.17 31,394.11
Relocation 184,810.49 37,678.96 4,081.97 12,211.44 238,782.86
Rental 101,835.28 19,974.94 629.08 1,228.42 123,667.72
Wage 417.34 23,596.73 1,059.66 20,571.95 45,645.68
Subtotal 287,241.25 106,383.20 6,420.94 39,444.98 439,490.37
Total 3,410,965.81 463,808.40 119,582.59 135,723.45 4,130,080.25
Propety Damage
Business 
Interruption 
Loss
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to get a final score and the Damage Scorecard is shown in Figure 5.28. Figure 5.29 shows the 
“affected” neighborhoods for the 1938 Hurricane scenario that will be used to further test the 
model. 
The proposed model was then run in a similar manner as earlier in the Chapter. 
“Unaffected” tracts had their demand set to zero, but their locations were still kept in the pool to 
choose for potential BBP sites. The eighteen POD set in the more vulnerable neighborhoods was 
used for the candidate POD sites. The solution to the model for p = 25 is shown in Figure 5.30, 
and Figure 5.31 shows the boxplots for p=25 solution. 
The disaster simulation offered two insights regarding the proposed model. The first 
insight was that the simulated disaster had more affected tracts in the eastern end of the CCR. 
During the model development, it was found that there were a greater number of more vulnerable 
tracts in the western end of the CCR. The model was developed to maximize the ability to 
service the more vulnerable tracts. However, this western “tilt” was not necessarily a factor in 
the simulated disaster, and the proposed model was able to perform as expected. The second 
insight was that a few of the BBPs were sited in more vulnerable neighborhoods that were not 
consider affected by the disaster. This may have been because the model still had the bias 
towards locating BBPs in more vulnerable neighborhoods, remembering that unaffected 
neighborhoods had a demand of zero, but were still in the pool of candidate sites for BBPs. 
Future investigation could possibly resolve whether that bias in the model should be removed. 
However, in a disaster situation, there may be some advantage to locating some BBPs in 
relatively unaffected neighborhoods, and some post event conditions may still affect 
neighborhoods that are more vulnerable even if they are not directly affected.  
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Figure 5.31 Box plots of the p = 25 solution for the 1938 Hurricane scenario. 
 
5.8 Transforming Transshipment points to Hubs 
Hubs are facilities that act as transshipment and sorting points in a many-to-many 
distribution system. Hubs do not serve each demand directly, but service the origin-destination 
pairs by concentrating the flow of goods to take advantage of economies of scale. This 
consolidation occurs on the routes from the origin to the hub, between hubs, and from the hub to 
the destination. There are two types of hub networks: single allocation and multiple allocation. In 
a single allocation system, the traffic coming into and out of a demand node is allocated to a 
single hub. A multiple allocation system allows that a demand node can receive traffic from 
more than one hub. To develop a hub network three things are assumed: (1) the hub network is 
complete with connections between every hub pair; (2) there is an economies of scale 
incorporated into the cost by discount factor (α) for using the inter-hub connection; and (3) no 
direct service is allowed between two non-hub nodes (Alumur and Kara 2008). 
Transforming the transshipment points located using the proposed model may some 
advantages. In the proposed model those points are treated as facilities in which a service or 
good is provided at that location. The facilities are located in way as to meet an expected 
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demand. The hub network focuses on the flow between origin-destination pairs. Campbell argues 
that the origin-distance pairs are analogous to demand nodes in the p-median model (Campbell 
1996). The other observation is that the flow from origin A – destination B is unique, and it must 
be accomplished in that manner. An example of this air travel, passengers or freight that want to 
travel from New York to Los Angeles must be the same from the beginning to the end of the trip. 
A hub network can better stretch transportation resources. A fully connected network has N(N-1) 
connections, where the number of nodes is N. So, for network, with N=9, there are 72 origin-
destination pairs. This would require a fleet of 12 vehicles, where each vehicle could service 6 
pairs a day. If one node was made into a hub, the network now has 2(N-1) connections. 
Therefore, with the same fleet of trucks, thirty-seven nodes could be serviced. 
To see if the POD-BBP system could be changed to a hub network some changes were 
made to the system. The hub network attempted is a single allocation network as suggested by 
the following formulation: 
 
 
Minimize:   
      
                   ∑i in I ∑j in J ∑k in K ∑m in M  Wij  Xijkm Cijkm  
 
 
 
(5.9) 
   
Subject to:   
   
∑k in K  Yk  = p  (5.10) 
∑k in K∑m in M Xi,j,k,m = 1 for all i and j (5.11) 
Zik ≤ Yk for all i and k  (5.12) 
Zik + Zjm - 2 Xijkm for all i, j, k,m (5.13) 
Xijkm  = 0,1 for all i, j, k, m  (5.14) 
Yk = 0,1 for all k (5.15) 
Zik = 0,1  for all i, k (5.16) 
   
 
 
172 
 
   
Xijkm = 1 if demand from location i met by location j is routed via hubs 
at locations k and m in that order; 
Cijkm = Total cost from location i to location j via hub k and hub m;  
 = Cik + Cmj + αCkm  and α is hub discount factor 
Wij = Flow from location i to location j; 
Yk = 1 if location k is a hub and 0 otherwise; 
Zik = 1 if location I is allocated to the hub k and 0 otherwise; and 
p =  number of hubs to locate. 
                                                                                                                                (Campbell 1994) 
The locations for the PODs and BBPs, as determined by the proposed model, were arranged into 
origin/destination pairs and the PODs made up the candidate Hub locations. The hub network 
required a flow into and out each node, so the demand for the neighborhoods serviced by a BBP 
was aggregated at the BBP. The demand would represent the flow from the POD to the BBP. To 
simulate the flow from the BBP to the POD the aggregated demand was divided by twelve, and 
Table 5.9 shows a sample of data. No travel between BBPs is accounted for in the simulation. 
The POD and BBP locations were determined from the proposed model p = 25 for the 1938 
Hurricane simulation. Figure 5.32 shows the solution for a three Hub network. 
Table 5.9 Sample of OD pairs and Hubs for 3 Hub Solution 
 
Origin Hub 1 Hub 2 Dest Flow (O →D)
NH122 POD10 POD10 POD10 1192.75
NH122 POD10 POD10 POD24 1192.75
NH122 POD10 POD10 POD29 1192.75
NH122 POD10 POD10 POD5 1192.75
NH122 POD10 POD10 POD9 1192.75
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
POD10 POD10 POD10 NH207 21558
POD24 POD10 POD10 NH91 10723
POD29 POD10 POD10 NH122 14313
POD5 POD10 POD10 NH70 5349
POD9 POD10 POD10 NH234 24384
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Using Campbell’s formulation, a three Hub network was developed. Thirty-seven origin-
destination pairs consisting of BBP to POD links was used. In the hub network supplies would 
come from the LSA to the POD. Travel to a hub then on to the BBPs, and from the BBPs on to 
the neighborhoods. The BBP to Neighborhood link was outside of the hub network. The hub 
network requires in and out flows along the network. The outflows of BBPs into the PODs was 
simulated. That assumption was developed because of the location of the CCR. The CCR has a 
spine of several major roadways, and it would not be unconceivable that relief supplies could 
enter the CCR from east or west along Route 1 or Interstate 95. The supplies could enter into the 
hub network at any node, or one type of supplies could be delivered to one location and another 
type at another. In the latter case, the supplies would move to the hub for consolidation and 
sorting. A fully connected network with thirty-seven nodes has 1,332 connections or 666 origin-
destination pairs, and by creating a three Hub network, those are reduced to 34 origin-destination 
pairs and 3 hub-to-hub pairs. 
5.9 Summary 
The proposed model was able to move from using generated data sets to the use of actual 
data sets. Actual data for demand, location, and network distances was established from the 
region of study. The model was able to integrate information about the social vulnerability of a 
neighborhood using the SOVI®. This information was used by the model to influence the siting 
of BBPs to neighborhoods that are more vulnerable. The model was also able to use that 
information to influence distances from more vulnerable neighborhoods and distribution points. 
The model produced results that were expected and the average distances from more vulnerable 
neighborhoods to BBPs were lower than average distances from less vulnerable neighborhoods. 
This was the overall objective of the model. The model did produce unanticipated results as p 
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became greater than forty. The model would begin to site “orphan” BBPs. Therefore, as the p 
value becomes greater than forty, the objective and average distances may make the model 
appear to become more efficient. This apparent efficiency may not be actual because, as p 
increases beyond forty, the model begins to locate “orphan” BBPs. 
The first stage of the model testing, using actual data, assumed that an event would affect 
all neighborhoods in the CCR. However, a real disaster would not necessarily affect all the 
neighborhoods. A computer simulation of a historical disaster was created. The 1938 Hurricane 
was recreated, and the results of the hurricane on today’s CCR was examined. The affected 
census tracts were used within the proposed model. The model was able to develop solutions for 
the distribution system. Building from the locations of the BBPs and PODs found for the 1938 
Hurricane scenario a 3 Hub network was developed. Using an established integer formulation for 
a single allocation hub network the proposed model could be converted into a hub network. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
 
6.1 Review of the study 
 
This research provides a modelling foundation from which information concerning a 
geographical area’s social vulnerability could be taken into account when siting distribution 
points for disaster relief supplies. There is a long history in the design and use of location 
allocation models. These models have been developed to meet the needs of both the public and 
private sector. As the world becomes more complex and interconnected advancements in 
location models become critical in developing systems to deliver products and services to people 
in a variety of conditions. 
A straightforward, simple method of integrating social vulnerability information into a 
multi-criteria location model was presented in this research. This method was a departure from 
earlier research in which models focused on population or household demand weighted 
measurements. Earlier models estimated demand by anticipated percentages of the population, 
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whereas this research allows an area’s demand importance to be influenced or weighted by its 
social vulnerability measurement. There is a growing body of research in the geographical 
analysis of hazards and disasters recognizing that there needs to be adaptable, flexible solutions 
to the aftermath of disasters. By being able to understand both the potential environmental and 
social vulnerabilities and inequalities of a place, systems could be better integrated to deliver 
services and supplies during such crisis. 
This study developed a proposed model that attempted to solve this integration of 
information problem. The model took a known index of social vulnerability, SOVI®, and used 
that information to guide it in locating distribution points. A stepwise development of the model 
was presented in Chapter Three. Through this approach, the model was able to utilize well-
known location allocation models and concepts. In doing so, the model was able to present a goal 
of maximizing coverage of more socially vulnerable neighborhoods, and was able to minimize 
the distances in the overall system for all the neighborhoods. The model was solved using linear 
programming techniques and commercially available solvers through SAS. 
Testing of the final model was done on an actual location, and this location was described 
in Chapter Four. Proposed in Chapter Four was a geographical area called the Coastal 
Cooperative Region (CCR) for the State of Connecticut. This region would be used as the 
geographical area in which the model was tested. After the model was tested for an event that 
was assumed to effect the entire region it was then tested for a simulated event. Using publicly 
available software the 1938 Hurricane was recreated, and the storm’s potential effects on today’s 
region were examined. Those results were used to test the proposed model. 
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6.2 Assessment of the Model 
The proposed model built on the work of Horner and Downs (Horner and Downs 2007; 
Horner and Downs 2010), and throughout the testing the model behaved as expected. The model 
was able to integrate information about a census tract’s social vulnerability. The model used that 
information to influence the locating of distribution points. As discussed, in the previous section, 
the model presented a multobjective approach. The final model contained four objectives: 1) 
minimize the total—distance weighted costs of the POD—BBP system, 2) minimize the 
uncovered “more” vulnerable demands; 3) minimize total—demand weighted costs in BBP-
neighborhood system, and 4) minimize the fixed facility costs of the BBP (refer back to Figure 
5.1 for relationship among the objectives). The model was able to balance those competing goals 
to produce plausible results. To achieve the final model the development was carried out in a 
step--wise fashion. This stepwise development led to the determination of the weighting factors k 
and M; with k being a weighting factor to balance the initial objectives of the model and M being 
the factor to influence more vulnerable neighborhoods as sites for BBPs. Those factors were kept 
the same when the model used actual data from the CCR. It was anticipated that the factors 
would have to be adjust with the use of actual data. However, the model performed as expected, 
and as it did using the generated data during development. 
When developing the CCR there were a set of PODs available. The belief was that the 
model would utilize all the available PODs. The model only used a maximum of thirty-nine 
PODs, and from these results, the decision was made to produce a smaller set of PODs from 
which the model could choose. The spatial distribution was examined and the first goal was to 
maintain the similar distribution pattern as the original set. A final set of eighteen PODs was 
chosen. These PODs were located in neighborhoods that were more vulnerable. This set was also 
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selected because it appeared that many of the neighborhoods that were more vulnerable were 
located towards the western end of the CCR. The belief was that this would make the model 
more efficient, and it did assist when the entire was tested as being effected by a disaster.  
To further test, the proposed model a simulated disaster was created. The historic 1938 
Hurricane was recreated using software available from FEMA. In this simulation about half of 
the CCR census tracts were determined to significantly affected by the storm, and most of those 
tracts were located in the eastern portion of the CCR. The proposed model was run using the 
eighteen POD set used for the general testing. The model produced an acceptable solution. 
The final analysis of the proposed model did not offer any novel formulation of classical 
location models. In the final analysis the POD—BBP transshipment points were transformed as 
origin-destination pairs. By thinking of them as origin—destination pairs allowed for the model 
to be transformed into a hub network. Using the p =25 solution for the 1938 Hurricane scenario 
37 origin – destination pairs were established. Using limited computer facilities, the model was 
able to produce a 3-hub network using an integer formulation of the p – hub problem. 
 
6.3 Directions for Future Research 
Future research can extend the models of this study in four additional areas: information 
integration, time, uncertainty, and reliability. The kernel of this research is the belief that 
information concerning a location’s social vulnerability can be used to help influence decisions 
by location allocation models for disaster relief. Further methods of integration could be 
examined. Can additional socio-economic factors be utilized to better pinpoint locations in need? 
Can sources such as remote sensing and imagery be utilized to determine an areas vulnerability? 
Can those same sources by used to determine a sites suitability for locating a distribution point? 
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Time is a large factor in disaster research. In a post- World War Two world much of the 
emphasis on the idea of time concerned preparedness and response, and in a post-Katrina world 
time, as a factor, in recovery is important. Recoveries are now seen as large endeavors that 
require large amounts of time, and over the recovery period, the needs of community recovering 
change. Research in how disaster relief supply chains have to accommodate for these changes is 
an important area that requires examination.  
Building on the ideas of additional information integration and time is research into 
uncertainty and reliability. The concept of uncertainty is a major factor in disaster research many 
of the questions of an event involve uncertainty – what will the extent of the event be? how long 
will the event last?; how many people will need immediate, short – term or long term assistance? 
The level of uncertainty surrounding a disaster is high, and techniques to better understand the 
uncertainty and to plan with it are strong areas of future research. Finally, the reliability of 
systems is important in disaster relief and future research is needed in assessing the failure of 
particular locations designated by model parameters. 
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